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We generalize Athey￿ s (2001) and McAdams￿(2003) results on the existence of
monotone pure strategy equilibria in Bayesian games. We allow action spaces to be
compact locally-complete metrizable semilattices and type spaces to be partially or-
dered probability spaces. Our proof is based upon contractibility rather than convexity
of best reply sets. Several examples illustrate the scope of the result, including new
applications to multi-unit auctions with risk-averse bidders.
1. Introduction
In an important paper, Athey (2001) demonstrates that a monotone pure strategy equilib-
rium exists whenever a Bayesian game satis￿es a Spence-Mirlees single-crossing property.
Athey￿ s result is now a central tool for establishing the existence of monotone pure strat-
egy equilibria in auction theory (see e.g., Athey (2001), Reny and Zamir (2004)). Recently,
McAdams (2003) has shown that Athey￿ s results, which exploit the assumed total order-
ing of the players￿one-dimensional type and action spaces, can be extended to settings in
which type and action spaces are multi-dimensional and only partially ordered. This permits
new existence results in auctions with multi-dimensional types and multi-unit demands (see
McAdams (2004)). The techniques employed by Athey and McAdams, while ingenious, have
their limitations and do not appear to easily extend beyond the environments they consider.
We therefore introduce a new approach.
The approach taken here exploits an important unrecognized property of a large class of
Bayesian games. In these games, the players￿pure-strategy best-reply sets, while possibly
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9905599, SES-0214421, SES-0617884) is gratefully acknowledged.nonconvex, are always contractible.1 This observation permits us to generalize the results of
Athey and McAdams in several directions. First, we permit in￿nite-dimensional type spaces
and in￿nite-dimensional action spaces. Both can occur, for example, in share-auctions where
a bidder￿ s type is a function expressing his marginal valuation at any quantity of the good,
and where a bidder￿ s action is a downward-sloping demand schedule. Second, even when type
and action spaces are subsets of Euclidean space, we permit more general joint distributions
over types, allowing one player to have private information about the support of another￿ s
private information, as well as permitting positive probability on lower dimensional subsets,
which can be useful when modeling random demand in auctions. Third, our approach allows
general partial orders on both type spaces and action spaces. This can be especially helpful
because, while single-crossing may fail for one partial order, it might nonetheless hold for
another, in which case our existence result can still be applied (see section 5 for two such
applications). Finally, while single-crossing is helpful in establishing the hypotheses of our
main theorem, it is not necessary; our hypotheses are satis￿ed even in instances where single-
crossing fails.
The key to our approach is to employ a more powerful ￿xed point theorem than those
employed in Athey (2001) and McAdams (2003). Both Athey and McAdams apply a ￿xed-
point theorem to the product of the players￿best-reply correspondences ￿ Athey applies
Kakutani￿ s theorem, McAdams applies Glicksberg￿ s theorem. In both cases, essentially all
of the e⁄ort is geared toward proving that sets of monotone pure-strategy best replies are
convex. Our central observation is that this impressive e⁄ort is unnecessary and, more
importantly, that the additional structure imposed to achieve the desired convexity (i.e.,
Euclidean type spaces with the coordinatewise partial order, Euclidean sublattice action
spaces, absolutely continuous type distributions), is unnecessary as well.
The ￿xed point theorem upon which our approach is based is due to Eilenberg and
Montgomery (1946) and does not require the correspondence in question to be convex-
valued. Rather, the correspondence need only be contractible-valued. Consequently, we
need only demonstrate that monotone pure-strategy best-reply sets are contractible. While
this task need not be straightforward in general, it turns out to be essentially trivial in the
class of Bayesian games of interest here. To gain a sense of this, note ￿rst that a pure
strategy ￿ a function from types to actions ￿ is a best reply for a player if and only if it
is a pointwise interim best reply for almost every type of that player. Consequently, any
piecewise combination of two best replies ￿ i.e., a strategy equal to one of the best replies
on some subset of types and equal to the other best reply on the remainder of types ￿ is
also a best reply. Thus, by reducing the set of types on which the ￿rst best reply is employed
1A set is contractible if it can be continuously deformed, within itself, to a single point. Convex sets are
contractible, but contractible sets need not be convex (e.g., the symbol ￿+￿viewed as a subset of R2).
2and increasing the set of types on which the second is employed, it is possible to move from
the ￿rst best reply to the second, all the while remaining within the set of best replies. With
this simple observation, the set of best replies can be shown to be contractible.2
Because contractibility of best-reply sets follows almost immediately from the pointwise
almost everywhere optimality of interim best replies, we are able to expand the domain of
analysis well beyond Euclidean type and action spaces, and most of our additional e⁄ort is di-
rected here. In particular, we require and prove two new results about the space of monotone
functions from partially ordered probability spaces into compact metric semilattices. The
￿rst of these results (Lemma A.10) is a generalization of Helly￿ s selection theorem stating
that, under suitable conditions, any sequence of monotone functions possesses a pointwise
almost everywhere convergent subsequence. The second result (Lemma A.16) provides con-
ditions under which the space of monotone functions is an absolute retract, a property that,
like convexity, renders a space amenable to ￿xed point analysis.
Our main result, Theorem 4.1, is as follows. Suppose that action spaces are compact
convex semilattices or compact locally-complete metric semilattices, that type spaces are
partially ordered probability spaces, that payo⁄s are continuous in actions for each type
vector, and that the joint distribution over types induces atomless marginals for each player
assigning positive probability only to sets that can be order-separated by a ￿xed countable
set of his types.3 If, whenever the others employ monotone pure strategies, each player￿ s set
of monotone pure-strategy best replies is nonempty and join-closed,4 then a monotone pure
strategy equilibrium exists.
We provide several applications yielding new existence results. First, we consider both
uniform-price and discriminatory multi-unit auctions with independent private values. We
depart from standard assumptions by permitting bidders to be risk averse. Under risk
aversion, monotonicity of best replies is known to fail under the standard coordinatewise
partial order over types. Nevertheless, by employing an alternative, yet natural, partial
order over types, we are able to demonstrate the existence of a monotone pure strategy
equilibrium with respect to this partial order. In the uniform-price auction no additional
assumptions are required, while in the discriminatory auction each bidder is assumed to have
CARA preferences. Another application considers a price-competition game between ￿rms
selling di⁄erentiated products. Firms have private information about their constant marginal
2Because we are concerned with monotone pure strategy best replies, some care must be taken to ensure
that one maintains monotonicity throughout the contraction. Further, continuity of the contraction requires
appropriate assumptions on the distribution over players￿types. In particular there can be no atoms.
3One set is order-separated by another if the one set contains two points between which lies a point in
the other.
4A subset of strategies is join-closed if the pointwise supremum of any pair of strategies in the set is also
in the set.
3cost as well as private information about market demand. While it is natural to assume that
costs may be a¢ liated, in the context we consider it is less natural to assume that information
about market demand is a¢ liated. Nonetheless, and again through a judicious choice of a
partial order over types, we are able to establish the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium
that is monotone in players￿costs, but not necessarily monotone in their private information
about demand. Our ￿nal application establishes the existence of monotone mixed strategy
equilibria when type spaces have atoms.5
If the actions of distinct players are strategic complements ￿an assumption we do not
impose ￿Van Zandt and Vives (2006) have shown that even stronger results can be obtained.
They prove that monotone pure strategy equilibria exist under somewhat more general dis-
tributional and action-space assumptions than we employ here, and demonstrate that such
an equilibrium can be obtained through iterative application of the best reply map.6 Van
Zandt and Vives (2006) obtain perhaps the strongest possible results for the existence of
monotone pure strategy equilibria in Bayesian games when strategic complementarities are
present. Of course, while many interesting economic games exhibit strategic complements,
many do not. Indeed, many auction games satisfy the hypotheses required to apply our
result here, but fail to satisfy the strategic complements condition.7 The two approaches are
therefore complementary.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the essential ideas
as well as the corollary of Eilenberg and Montgomery￿ s (1946) ￿xed point theorem that is
central to our approach. Section 3 describes the formal environment, including semilattices
and related issues. Section 4 contains our main result, section 6 contains its proof, and
section 5 provides several applications.
2. The Main Idea
As already mentioned, the proof of our main result is based upon a ￿xed point theorem
that permits the correspondence for which a ￿xed point is sought ￿ here, the product of
the players￿monotone pure best reply correspondences ￿ to have contractible rather than
convex values.
In this section, we introduce this ￿xed point theorem and also illustrate the ease with
5A player￿ s mixed strategy is monotone if every action in the totally ordered support of one of his types
is greater or equal to every action in the totally ordered support of any lower type.
6Related results can be found in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Vives (1990).
7In a ￿rst-price IPV auction, for example, a bidder might increase his bid if his opponent increases her
bid slightly when her private value is high. However, for su¢ ciently high increases in her bid at high private
values, the bidder might be better o⁄ reducing his bid (and chance of winning) to obtain a higher surplus
when he does win. Such strictly optimal nonmonotonic responses to increases in the opponent￿ s strategy are
not possible under strategic complements.
4which contractibility can be established, focussing on the most basic case in which type
spaces are [0;1], action spaces are subsets of [0;1], and the marginal distribution over each
player￿ s type space is atomless.
A subset X of a metric space is contractible if for some x0 2 X there is a continuous
function h : [0;1] ￿ X ! X such that for all x 2 X; h(0;x) = x and h(1;x) = x0: We then
say that h is a contraction for X:
Note that every convex set is contractible since, choosing any point x0 in the set, the
function h(￿;x) = (1￿￿)x+￿x0 is a contraction. On the other hand, there are contractible
sets that are not convex (e.g., the symbol ￿+￿ ). Hence, contractibility is a strictly more
permissive condition than convexity.
A subset X of a metric space Y is said to be a retract of Y if there is a continuous function
mapping Y onto X leaving every point of X ￿xed. A metric space (X;d) is an absolute
retract if for every metric space (Y;￿) containing X as a closed subset and preserving its
topology, X is a retract of Y: Examples of absolute retracts include closed convex subsets
of Euclidean space or of any metric space, and many nonconvex sets as well (e.g., any
contractible polyhedron).8 The ￿xed point theorem we make use of is the following corollary
of an even more general result due to Eilenberg and Montgomery (1946).9
Theorem 2.1. Suppose that a compact metric space (X;d) is an absolute retract and that
F : X ￿ X is an upper-hemicontinuous, nonempty-valued, contractible-valued correspon-
dence.10 Then F has a ￿xed point.
For our purposes, the correspondence F is the product of the players￿monotone pure
strategy best reply correspondences and X is the product of their sets of monotone pure
strategies. While we must eventually establish all of the properties necessary to apply The-
orem 2.1, our modest objective for the remainder of this section is to show, with remarkably
little e⁄ort, that in the simple environment considered here, F is contractible-valued, i.e.,
that monotone pure best reply sets are contractible.
Suppose that player 1￿ s type is drawn uniformly from the unit interval [0;1]. Fix
monotone pure strategies for other players, and suppose that ￿ s : [0;1] ! A is a monotone
best reply for player 1, where A ￿ [0;1] is player 1￿ s compact action set. Indeed, suppose
that ￿ s is player 1￿ s largest monotone best reply in the sense that if s is any other monotone
8Indeed, a compact subset, X; of Euclidean space is an absolute retract if and only if it is contractible
and locally contractible. The latter means that for every x0 2 X and every neighborhood U of x0; there is
a neighborhood V of x0 and a continuous h : [0;1] ￿ V ! U such that h(0;x) = x and h(1;x) = x0 for all
x 2 V:
9Theorem 2.1 follows directly from Eilenberg and Montgomery (1946) Theorem 1, because every ab-
solute retract is a contractible absolute neighborhood retract (Borsuk (1966), V (2.3)) and every nonempty
contractible set is acyclic (Borsuk (1966), II (4.11)).
10By upper-hemicontinuous, we shall always mean that the correspondence in question has a closed graph.
5best reply, then ￿ s(t) ￿ s(t) for every type t of player 1: We shall provide a contraction that
shrinks player 1￿ s entire set of monotone best replies, within itself, to the largest monotone
best reply ￿ s: The simple, but key, observation is that a pure strategy is a best reply for player
1 if and only if it is a pointwise best reply for almost every type t 2 [0;1] of player 1.
Consider the following candidate contraction. For ￿ 2 [0;1] and any monotone best reply,





if t ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ and ￿ < 1
otherwise.
Note that h(0;s) = s; h(1;s) = ￿ s; and h(￿;s)(t) is always either ￿ s(t) or s(t) and so is a
best reply for almost every t. Hence, by the key observation in the previous paragraph,
h(￿;s)(￿) is a best reply. The pure strategy h(￿;s)(￿) is monotone because it is the smaller
of two monotone functions for low values of t and the larger of them for high values of t.
Moreover, because the marginal distribution over player 1￿ s type is atomless, the monotone
pure strategy h(￿;s)(￿) varies continuously in the arguments ￿ and s; when the distance
between two strategies of player 1 is de￿ned to be the integral with respect to his type
distribution of their absolute pointwise di⁄erence (see section 6).11 Consequently, h is a
contraction under this metric, and so player 1￿ s set of monotone best replies is contractible.
It￿ s that simple.
Figure 2.1 shows how the contraction works when player 1￿ s set of actions A happens to
be ￿nite, so that his set of monotone best replies cannot be convex in the usual sense unless
it is a singleton. Three monotone functions are shown in each panel, where 1￿ s actions are
on the vertical axis and 1￿ s types are on the horizontal axis. The dotted line step function
is s; the solid line step function is ￿ s; and the thick solid line step function (red) is the step
function determined by the contraction h:
In panel (a), ￿ = 0 and h coincides with s. The position of the vertical line (blue)
appearing in each panel represents the value of ￿: The vertical line (blue) appearing in each
panel intersects the horizontal axis at the point 1 ￿ ￿. When ￿ = 0 the vertical line is at
the far right-hand side, as shown in panel (a). As indicated by the arrow, the vertical line
moves continuously toward the origin as ￿ moves from 0 to 1. The thick (red) step function
determined by the contraction h is s(t) for values of t to the left of the vertical line and is
￿ s(t) for values of t to the right; see panels (b) and (c). The step function h therefore changes
continuously with ￿ because the areas between strategies change continuously. In panel (d),
￿ = 1 and h coincides with ￿ s: So altogether, as ￿ moves continuously from 0 to 1; the image
of the contraction moves continuously from s to ￿ s:
11This particular metric is important because it renders a player￿ s payo⁄continuous in his strategy choice.
6(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 2.1: The Contraction
Two points are worth mentioning before moving on. First, single-crossing plays no role
in establishing the contractibility of sets of monotone best replies. As we shall see, ensuring
the existence of monotone pure strategy best replies is where single-crossing can be helpful.
Thus, the present approach clari￿es the role of single-crossing insofar as the existence of
monotone pure strategy equilibrium is concerned.12 Second, the action spaces employed in
the above illustration are totally ordered, as in Athey (2001). Consequently, if two actions
are optimal for some type of player 1, then the maximum of the two actions, being one or
the other of them, is also optimal. The optimality of the maximum of two optimal actions
is important for ensuring that a largest monotone best reply exists. When action spaces are
only partially ordered (e.g., when actions are multi-dimensional with, say, the coordinatewise
partial order), the maximum of two optimal actions need not even be well-de￿ned, let alone
optimal. Therefore, to also cover partially ordered action spaces, we assume in the sequel
(see section 3) that action spaces are semilattices ￿ i.e., that for every pair of actions there
is a least upper bound (l.u.b.) ￿ and that the l.u.b. of two optimal actions is optimal.
Stronger versions of both assumptions are employed in McAdams (2003).
12Both Athey (2001) and McAdams (2003) employ single-crossing to help establish the existence of
monotone best replies and to establish the convexity of the set of monotone best replies. Their single-
crossing conditions are therefore more restrictive than necessary. See Subsection 4.1.
73. The Environment
3.1. Partial Orders, Lattices and Semilattices
Let A be a nonempty set partially ordered by ￿ :13 If A is endowed with a sigma-algebra of
subsets A; then the partial order ￿ on A is called measurable if f(a;b) 2 A￿A : b ￿ ag is a
member of A ￿ A:14 If A is endowed with a topology, then the partial order ￿ on A is called
closed if f(a;b) 2 A ￿ A : b ￿ ag is closed in the product topology. The partial order ￿ on
A is called convex if f(a;b) 2 A￿A : b ￿ ag is convex. Note that if the partial order on A is
convex then A is convex because a ￿ a for every a 2 A: Say that A is upper-bound-convex if
it contains the convex combination of any two members whenever one of them, ￿ a say, is an
upper bound for A ￿i.e., ￿ a ￿ a for every a 2 A.15 Every convex set is upper-bound-convex.
For a;b 2 A; if the set fa;bg has a least upper bound (l.u.b.) in A; then it is unique
and will be denoted by a _ b, the join of a and b: In general, such a bound need not exist.
However, if every pair of points in A has an l.u.b. in A; then we shall say that A is a
semilattice. It is straightforward to show that, in a semilattice, every ￿nite set, fa;b;:::;cg;
has a least upper bound, which we denote by _fa;b;:::;cg or a _ b _ ::: _ c:
If the set fa;bg has a greatest lower bound (g.l.b.) in A; then it too is unique and it will
be denoted by a ^ b; the meet of a and b: Once again, in general, such a bound need not
exist. If every pair of points in A has both an l.u.b.. in A and a g.l.b. in A, then we say
that A is a lattice.16
Clearly, every lattice is a semilattice. However, the converse is not true. For example,
employing the coordinatewise partial order on vectors in Rm; the set of vectors whose sum
is at least one is a semilattice, but not a lattice.
A metric semilattice is a semilattice, A; endowed with a metric under which the join
operator, _; is continuous as a function from A￿A into A. In the special case in which A is
a metric semilattice in Rm under the Euclidean metric, we say that A is a Euclidean metric
semilattice. Note also that because in a semilattice b ￿ a if and only if a _ b = b, a partial
order in a metric semilattice is necessarily closed.17
A semilattice A is complete if every nonempty subset S of A has a least upper bound, _S;
in A: A metric semilattice A is locally complete if for every a 2 A and every neighborhood
13Hence, ￿ is transitive (a ￿ b and b ￿ c imply a ￿ c); re￿ exive (a ￿ a); and antisymmetric (a ￿ b and
b ￿ a imply a = b):
14Recall that A ￿ A is the smallest sigma algebra containing all sets of the form B ￿ C with B;C in A:
15Sets without upper bounds are trivially upper-bound-convex.
16De￿ning a semilattice in terms of the join operator, _, rather than the meet operator, ^; is entirely a
matter of convention.
17The converse can fail. For example, the set A = f(x;y) 2 R2
+ : x+y = 1g[f(1;1)g is a semilattice with
the coordinatewise partial order, and this order is closed under the Euclidean metric. But A is not a metric
semilattice because whenever an 6= bn and an;bn ! a; we have (1;1) = lim(an_bn) 6= (liman)_(limbn) = a.
8U of a; there is a neighborhood W of a contained in U such that every nonempty subset S
of W has a least upper bound, _S; contained in U: Lemma A.18 establishes that a compact
metric semilattice A is locally complete if and only if for every a 2 A and every sequence
an ! a; limm(_n￿man) = a:18 A distinct su¢ cient condition for local completeness is given
in Lemma A.20.
Some examples of compact locally-complete metric semilattices are,
￿ ￿nite semilattices
￿ compact sublattices of Rm￿because the join of any two points is their coordinatewise
maximum
￿ compact Euclidean metric semilattices (Lemma A.19)
￿ compact upper-bound-convex semilattices in Rm endowed with the coordinatewise par-
tial order (Lemmas A.17 and A.19)
￿ The space of continuous functions f : [0;1] ! [0;1] satisfying for some ￿ > 0 the
Lipschitz condition jf(x) ￿ f(y)j ￿ ￿jx ￿ yj; endowed with the maximum norm kfk =
maxx jf(x)j; and partially ordered by f ￿ g if f(x) ￿ g(x) for all x 2 [0;1]:
The last example is an in￿nite dimensional compact locally-complete metric semilattice.
In general, and unlike compact Euclidean metric semilattices, in￿nite dimensional metric
semilattices need not be locally complete even if compact and convex.19
Finally, if a;b; and c are members of a partially ordered set, we say that b lies between a
and c if a ￿ b ￿ c:
3.2. A Class of Bayesian Games
There are N players, i = 1;2;:::;N: Player i￿ s type space is Ti and his action space is Ai;
and both are nonempty and partially ordered. Unless a notational distinction is helpful, all
partial orders, although possibly distinct, will be denoted by ￿ : Player i￿ s payo⁄function is
ui : A￿T ! R, where A = ￿N
i=1Ai and T = ￿N
i=1Ti: For each player i; Ti is a sigma-algebra
of subsets of Ti; and members of Ti will often be referred to simply as measurable sets. The
common prior over the players￿types is a countably additive probability measure ￿ de￿ned
on T1 ￿ ::: ￿ TN: Let G denote this Bayesian game.
18Hence, compactness and metrizability of a lattice under the order topology (see Birkoh⁄ (1967, p.244)
are su¢ cient, but not necessary, for local completeness of the corresponding semilattice.
19No Lp space is locally complete when p < +1 and endowed with the pointwise partial order. See
Hart and Weiss (2005) for a compact metric semilattice that is not locally complete. Their example can be
modi￿ed so that the space is in addition convex and locally convex.
9We shall make use of the following additional assumptions, where ￿i denotes the marginal
of ￿ on Ti: Hence, the domain of ￿i is Ti: For every player i;
G.1 The partial order on Ti is measurable.
G.2 The probability measure ￿i on Ti is atomless.
G.3 There is a countable subset T 0
i of Ti such that every set in Ti assigned positive proba-
bility by ￿i contains two points between which lies a point in T 0
i :
G.4 Ai is a compact metric space and a semilattice with a closed partial order.20
G.5 Either (i) Ai is a convex and locally convex topological space and the partial order on
Ai is convex, or (ii) Ai is a locally-complete metric semilattice.21
G.6 ui(a;t) is bounded, jointly measurable, and continuous in a 2 A for every t 2 T:
Assumptions G.1-G.6 strictly generalize the assumptions in Athey (2001) and McAdams
(2003) who assume that each Ai is a compact sublattice of Euclidean space and hence a
compact locally-complete metric semilattice, that each Ti is a Euclidean cube [0;1]mi endowed
with the coordinatewise partial order, and that ￿ is absolutely continuous with respect to
Lebesgue measure.22;23 This additional structure is necessary for their Kakutani-Glicksberg-
based approach.24
In addition to permitting in￿nite-dimensional type spaces, assumption G.1 permits the
partial order on player i￿ s type space to be distinct from the usual coordinatewise partial
order when Ti is Euclidean. As we shall see, this ￿ exibility is very helpful in providing new
equilibrium existence results for multi-unit auctions with risk averse bidders.
20Note that G.4 does not require Ai to be a metric semilattice ￿its join operator need not be continuous.
21It is permissible for (i) to hold for some players and (ii) to hold for others. A topological space is convex
if the operation of taking convex combinations of pairs of points yields a point in the space and is jointly
continuous in the pair of points and in the weights on them. A topological space is locally convex if for every
open set U; every point in U has a convex open neighborhood contained in U.
22McAdams (2003) assumes, further, that the joint density over types is everywhere strictly positive.
23If ￿ is absolutely continuous and each Ti = [0;1]mi; then let T0
i be the set of points in Ti with rational
coordinates. Consequently, if ￿i(B) > 0; then by Fubini￿ s theorem there exists ti 2 (0;1)mi such that
B \ [0;1]ti contains a continuum of members, any two of which de￿ne an interval containing a member of
T0
i : Hence, G.3 holds.
24Indeed, suppose a player￿ s action set is the semilattice A = f(1;0);(1=2;1=2);(0;1);(1;1)g in R2; with the
coordinatewise partial order and note that A is not a sublattice of R2. It is not di¢ cult to see that this player￿ s
set of monotone pure strategies from [0;1] into A; endowed with the metric d(f;g) =
R 1
0 jf(x) ￿ g(x)jdx; is
homeomorphic to three line segments joined at a common endpoint. Consequently, this strategy set is not
homeomorphic to a convex set and so neither Kakutani￿ s nor Glicksberg￿ s theorems can be directly applied.
On the other hand, this strategy set is an absolute retract (see Lemma A.16), which is su¢ cient for our
approach.
10Assumption G.2 is used to establish the contractibility of the players￿sets of monotone
best replies and in particular to construct an associated contraction that is continuous in a
topology in which payo⁄s are continuous as well.
Assumption G.3 connects the partial order on a player￿ s type space with his marginal
distribution, and it implies in particular that no atomless subset of a player￿ s type space
having positive probability can be totally unordered. For example, if Ti = [0;1]2 is endowed
with the Borel sigma-algebra and the coordinatewise partial order, G.3 requires ￿i to assign
probability zero to any atomless negatively sloped line in Ti. In fact, whenever Ti happens
to be a separable metric space and Ti contains the open sets, G.3 holds if every atomless set
having positive ￿i-measure contains two ￿strictly ordered￿points (Lemma A.21).25
Together with G.1 and G.4, G.3 ensures the compactness of the players￿sets of monotone
pure strategies (Lemma A.10) in a topology in which payo⁄s are continuous.26 Thus, al-
though G.3 is logically unrelated to Milgrom and Weber￿ s (1985) absolute-continuity assump-
tion on the joint distribution over types, it plays the same compactness role for monotone
pure strategies as the Milgrom-Weber assumption plays for distributional strategies.27;28
Assumption G.5 is used in ensuring that the set of monotone pure strategies is an absolute
retract and therefore amenable to ￿xed point analysis.
Assumption G.6 is used to ensure that best replies are well de￿ned and that best-reply
correspondences are upper-hemicontinuous. Assumption G.6 is trivially satis￿ed when action
spaces are ￿nite. Thus, for example, it is possible to consider auctions here by supposing
that players￿bid spaces are discrete. We do so in section 5.
As functions from types to actions, best replies for any player i are determined only up to
￿i measure zero sets. This leads us to the following de￿nitions. A pure strategy for player i is
a function, si : Ti ! Ai; that is ￿i-a.e. (almost-everywhere) equal to a measurable function,
and is monotone if t0
i ￿ ti implies si(t0
i) ￿ si(ti) for all ti;t0
i 2 Ti.29;30 Let Si denote player
25Two points in a partially ordered metric space are strictly ordered if they are contained in disjoint open
sets such that every point in one set is greater or equal to every point in the other.
26Indeed, without G.3, a player￿ s type space could be the negative diagonal in [0;1]2 endowed with the
coordinatewise partial order. But then every measurable function from types to actions would be monotone
because no two distinct types are ordered. Compactness in a useful topology is then e⁄ectively precluded.
27To see that even G.2 and G.3 together do not imply the Milgrom and Weber (1985) restriction that ￿
is absolutely continuous with respect to the product of its marginals ￿1 ￿ ::: ￿ ￿n, note that G.2 and G.3
hold when there are two players, each with unit interval type space, and where types are drawn according
to Lebesgue measure conditional on any one of ￿nitely many positively or negatively sloped lines in the unit
square.
28One might wonder whether G.3 can be weakened by requiring instead merely that every atomless set in
Ti assigned positive probability by ￿i contains two distinct ordered points. The answer is ￿no,￿in the sense
that this weakening permits examples in which every measurable function from [0;1] into [0;1] is monotone,
precluding compactness of the set of monotone pure strategies in a useful topology.
29Recall that a property P(ti) holds ￿i-a.e. if the set of ti for which P(ti) holds contains a measurable
subset having ￿i-measure one.
30Because under G.4 Ai is a metric space, we willl always endow Ai with the Borel sigma-algebra. Thus
11i￿ s set of pure strategies and let S = ￿N
i=1Si:
A vector of pure strategies, (^ s1;:::; ^ sN) 2 S is an equilibrium if for every player i and
every pure strategy s0









where the left-hand side, henceforth denoted by Ui(^ s); is player i￿ s payo⁄ given the joint
strategy ^ s; and the right-hand side is his payo⁄ when he employs s0
i and the others employ
^ s￿i.
It will sometimes be helpful to speak of the payo⁄ to player i￿ s type ti from the action






where ￿i(￿jti) is a version of the conditional probability on T￿i given ti: A single such version
is ￿xed for each player i once and for all.
4. The Main Result
Call a subset of player i￿ s pure strategies join-closed if for any pair of strategies, si;s0
i; in the
subset, the strategy taking the action si(ti) _ s0
i(ti) for each ti 2 Ti is also in the subset.31
We can now state our main result, whose proof is provided in section 6.
Theorem 4.1. If G.1-G.6 hold, and each player￿ s set of monotone pure best replies is non-
empty and join-closed whenever the others employ monotone pure strategies, then G pos-
sesses a monotone pure strategy equilibrium.
A strengthening of Theorem 4.1 can be helpful when one wishes to demonstrate not
merely the existence of a monotone pure strategy equilibrium but the existence of a monotone
pure strategy equilibrium within a particular subset of strategies. For example, in a uniform-
price auction for m units, a strategy mapping a player￿ s m-vector of marginal values into
a vector of m bids is undominated only if his bid for a kth unit is no greater than his
marginal value for a kth unit. As formulated, Theorem 4.1 does not directly permit one to
measurable subsets of Ai are the Borel subsets.
31Note that when the join operator is continuous, as it is in a metric semilattice, the resulting function is
a.e.-measurable, being the composition of a.e.-measurable and continuous functions. But even when the join
operator is not continuous, because the join of two monotone pure strategies is monotone, it is a.e.-measurable
under the hypotheses of Lemma A.11.
12demonstrate the existence of an undominated equilibrium.32 The next result takes care of
this. Its proof is a straightforward extension of the proof of Theorem 4.1, and is provided in
Remark 8.
A subset of player i￿ s pure strategies is called pointwise-limit-closed if whenever s1
i;s2
i;:::
are each in the set and sn
i (ti) !n si(ti) for ￿i almost-every ti 2 Ti; then si is also in the
set. A subset of player i￿ s pure strategies is called piecewise-closed if whenever si and s0
i
are in the set, then so is any strategy s00
i such that for every ti 2 Ti either s00




Theorem 4.2. Under the hypotheses of Theorem 4.1, if for each player i; Ci is a join-closed,
piecewise-closed and pointwise-limit-closed subset of pure strategies containing at least one
monotone pure strategy, and the intersection of Ci with i￿ s set of monotone pure best replies
is nonempty whenever every other player j employs a monotone pure strategy in Cj, then G
possesses a monotone pure strategy equilibrium in which each player i￿ s pure strategy is in
Ci.
Remark 1. When player i￿ s action space is a semilattice with a closed partial order (as
implied by G.4) and Ci is de￿ned by any collection of weak inequalities, i.e., if Fi and Gi
are arbitrary collections of measurable functions from Ti into Ai and Ci = \f2Fi;g2Gifsi 2
Si : g(ti) ￿ si(ti) ￿ f(ti) for ￿i a.e. ti 2 Tig; then Ci is join-closed, piecewise-closed and
pointwise-limit-closed.
The next section provides conditions that are su¢ cient for the hypotheses of Theorem
4.1.
4.1. Su¢ cient Conditions
Both Athey (2001) and McAdams (2003), within the con￿nes of a lattice, make use of
quasisupermodularity and single-crossing conditions on interim payo⁄s. We now provide
weaker versions of both of these conditions, as well as single condition that is weaker than
their combination.
Suppose that player i￿ s action space, Ai; is a lattice. We say that player i￿ s interim payo⁄
function Vi is weakly quasisupermodular if for all monotone pure strategies s￿i of the others,
all ai;a0
i 2 Ai; and every ti 2 Ti;
Vi(ai;ti;s￿i) ￿ Vi(ai ^ a
0





32Note that it is not possible to restrict the action space alone to ensure that the player chooses an
undominated strategy since the bids that he must be permitted to choose will depend upon his private type,
i.e., his vector of marginal values.
13McAdams (2003) imposes the stronger assumption of quasisupermodularity ￿ due to
Milgrom and Shannon (1994) ￿which requires, in addition, that the second inequality must
be strict if the ￿rst happens to be strict.33 It is well-known that Vi is supermodular in actions
￿hence weakly quasisupermodular ￿when the coordinates of a player￿ s own action vector
are complementary, i.e., when Ai = [0;1]K is endowed with the coordinatewise partial order
and the second cross-partial derivatives of Vi(ai1;:::;aiK;ti;s￿i) with respect distinct action
coordinates are nonnegative.34
We say that i￿ s interim payo⁄function Vi satis￿es weak single-crossing if for all monotone
pure strategies s￿i of the others, for all player i action pairs a0














Athey (2001) and McAdams (2003) assume that Vi satis￿es the slightly more stringent
single-crossing condition in which, in addition to the above, the second inequality is strict
whenever the ￿rst one is.35 We next present a condition that will be shown to be weaker
than the combination of weak quasisupermodularity and weak single-crossing.
Return now to the case in which Ai is merely a semilattice. For any joint pure strategy of
the others, player i￿ s interim best reply correspondence is a mapping from his type into the
set of optimal actions ￿or interim best replies ￿for that type. Say that player i￿ s interim best
reply correspondence is monotone if for every monotone joint pure strategy of the others,
whenever action ai is optimal for player i when his type is ti; and a0
i is optimal when his
type is t0
i ￿ ti; then ai _ a0
i is optimal when his type is t0
i:36
The following result relates the above conditions to the hypotheses of Theorem 4.1.
Proposition 4.3. The hypotheses of Theorem 4.1 are satis￿ed if G.1-G.6 hold, and if for
each player i and for each monotone joint pure strategy of the other players, at least one of
the following three conditions is satis￿ed.37
33When actions are totally ordered, as in Athey (2001), interim payo⁄s are automatically supermodular,
and hence both quasisupermodular and weakly quasisupermodular.
34Complementarities between the actions of distinct players is not implied. This is useful because, for
example, many auction games satisfy only own-action complementarity.
35For conditions on the joint distribution of types, ￿; and the players￿payo⁄functions, ui(a;t); that imply
the more stringent condition, see Athey (2001, pp.879-81), McAdams (2003, p.1197) and Van Zandt and
Vives (2005).
36This is strictly weaker than requiring the interim best reply correspondence to be increasing in the strong
set order, which in any case requires the additional structure of a lattice (see Milgrom and Shannon (1994)).
37Which of the three conditions is satis￿ed is permitted to depend both on the player, i; and on the joint
pure strategy employed by the others.
141. Player i￿ s action space is a lattice and i￿ s interim payo⁄function is weakly quasisuper-
modular and satis￿es weak single-crossing.
2. Player i￿ s interim best reply correspondence is nonempty-valued and monotone.
3. Player i￿ s set of monotone pure strategy best replies is nonempty and join-closed.
Furthermore, the three conditions are in increasing order of generality, i.e., 1 =) 2 =) 3:
Proof. Because, under G.1-G.6, the hypotheses of Theorem 4.1 hold if condition 3 holds for
each player i; it su¢ ces to show that 1 =) 2 =) 3: So, ￿x some player i and some monotone
pure strategy for every player but i for the remainder of the proof.
(1 =) 2): Suppose i￿ s action space is a lattice. By G.4 and G.6, for each of i￿ s types,
his interim payo⁄ function is continuous on his compact action space. Player i therefore
possesses an optimal action for each of his types and so his interim best reply correspondence
is nonempty-valued. Suppose that action ai is optimal for i when his type is ti and a0
i is
optimal when his type is t0
i ￿ ti: Then because ai ^ a0
i is no better than ai when i￿ s type is
ti; weak quasisupermodularity implies that ai _ a0
i is at least as good as a0
i when i￿ s type is
ti: Weak single-crossing then implies that ai _a0
i is at least as good as a0
i when i￿ s type is t0
i:
Since a0
i is optimal when i￿ s type is t0
i so too must be ai _ a0
i: Hence, i￿ s interim best reply
correspondence is monotone.
(2 =) 3): Let Bi : Ti ￿ Ai denote i￿ s interim best reply correspondence. If ai and
a0
i are in Bi(ti); then ai _ a0
i is also in Bi(ti) by the monotonicity of Bi(￿) (set ti = t0
i in
the de￿nition of a monotone correspondence). Consequently, Bi(ti) is a subsemilattice of
i￿ s action space for each ti and therefore i￿ s set of monotone pure strategy best replies is
join-closed (measurability of the pointwise join of two strategies follows as in footnote 31).
It remains to show that i￿ s set of monotone pure best replies is nonempty.
Let ￿ ai(ti) = _Bi(ti); which is well-de￿ned because G.4 and Lemma A.6 imply that Ai is
a complete semilattice. Because i￿ s interim payo⁄function is continuous in his action, Bi(ti)
is compact. Hence Bi(ti) is a compact subsemilattice of Ai and so Bi(ti) is itself complete
by Lemma A.6. Therefore, ￿ ai(ti) is a member of Bi(ti) implying that ￿ ai(ti) is optimal for
every ti: It remains only to show that ￿ ai(ti) is monotone (measurability in ti can be ensured
by Lemma A.11).
So, suppose that t0
i ￿i ti: Because ￿ ai(ti) 2 Bi(ti) and ￿ ai(t0
i) 2 Bi(t0
i); the monotonicity of
Bi(￿) implies that ￿ ai(ti) _ ￿ ai(t0
i) 2 Bi(t0
i): Therefore, because ￿ ai(t0
i) is the largest member of
Bi(t0
i) we have ￿ ai(t0
i) = ￿ ai(ti) _ ￿ ai(t0
i) ￿ ￿ a(ti); as desired.
Remark 2. The environments considered in Athey (2001) and McAdams (2003) are strictly
more restrictive than G.1-G.6 permit. Moreover, their conditions on interim payo⁄s are
15strictly more restrictive than condition 1 of Proposition 4.3. Theorem 4.1 is therefore a
strict generalization of their main results.
When G.1-G.6 hold, it is often possible to apply Theorem 4.1 by verifying condition
1 of Proposition 4.3. But there are important exceptions. For example, Reny and Zamir
(2004) have shown in the context of asymmetric ￿rst-price auctions that, when bidders have
distinct and ￿nite bid sets, monotone best replies exist even though weak single-crossing
fails. Further, since action sets (i.e., real-valued bids) there are totally ordered, best reply
sets are necessarily join-closed and so the hypotheses of Theorem 4.1 are satis￿ed even
though condition 1 of Proposition 4.3 is not. A similar situation arises in the context of
multi-unit discriminatory auctions with risk averse bidders (see subsection 5 below). There,
under CARA utility weak quasisupermodularity fails but sets of monotone best replies are
nonetheless non-empty and join-closed because condition 2 of Proposition 4.3 is satis￿ed.
We now turn to several applications of our results.
5. Applications
5.1. Uniform-Price Multi-Unit Auctions with Risk Averse Bidders
Consider a uniform-price auction with n bidders and m homogeneous units of a single good
for sale. Each bidder i simultaneously submits a bid, b = (b1;:::;bm); where bi1 ￿ ::: ￿ bim
and each bik is taken from the ￿nite set B ￿ [0;1]. Call bik bidder i￿ s kth unit-bid. The
uniform price, p; is the m + 1st highest of all nm unit-bids. Each unit-bid above p wins a
unit at price p, and any remaining units are awarded to unit-bids equal to p according to a
random-bidder-order tie-breaking rule.38
Bidder i￿ s private type is his vector of nonincreasing marginal values, so that his type
space is Ti = fti 2 [0;1]m : ti1 ￿ ::: ￿ timg. Bidder i is risk averse with utility function for
money ui : [￿m;m] ! R; where u0
i > 0; u00
i ￿ 0: If bidder i￿ s type is ti and he wins k units
at price p; his payo⁄is ui(ti1 +:::+tik ￿kp): Types are chosen independently across bidders
and bidder i￿ s type-vector is chosen according to the density fi; which need not be positive
on all of Ti:39
Multi-unit uniform-price auctions always have trivial equilibria in weakly dominated
strategies in which some player always bids very high on all units and all others always
38The tie-breaking rule is as follows. Bidders are ordered randomly and uniformly. Then, one bidder at a
time according to this order, each bidder￿ s total remaining demand (i.e., his number of bids equal to p); or
as much as possible, is ￿lled at price p per unit until supply is exhausted.
39It is possible to permit a bidder￿ s total demand to be stochastic in the sense that, for each k > 1; his
marginal value for a kth and higher unit may be zero with positive probability, as might occur if a bidder￿ s
endowment of the good were private information. We will not pursue this here.
16bid zero. We wish to establish the existence of monotone pure strategy equilibria that are
not trivial in this sense. But observe that, because the set of feasible bids is ￿nite, bidding
above one￿ s marginal value on some unit need not be weakly dominated. Indeed, it might be
a strict best reply for bidder i of type ti to bid bk > tik for a kth unit so long as no feasible
bid is in [tik;bk). Such a kth unit-bid might permit bidder i to win a kth unit and earn a
surplus with high probability rather than risk losing the unit by bidding below tik. On the
other hand, in this instance there is never any gain, and there might be a loss, from bidding
above bk on a kth unit.
Call a monotone pure strategy equilibrium nontrivial if for each bidder i; for fi almost-
every ti; and for every k; bidder i￿ s kth unit-bid does not exceed the smallest feasible bid
greater than or equal to tik: As shown by McAdams (2006), under the coordinatewise partial
order on type and action spaces, nontrivial monotone pure strategy equilibria need not exist
when bidders are risk averse, as we permit here. Nonetheless, we will demonstrate that a
nontrivial monotone pure strategy equilibrium does exist under an economically motivated
partial order on type spaces that di⁄ers from the coordinatewise partial order; we maintain
the coordinatewise partial order the action space Bm of m-vectors of unit-bids.
Before introducing the new partial order, it is instructive to see what goes wrong with
the coordinatewise partial order on types. The heart of the matter is that single-crossing
fails. To see why, it is enough to consider the case of two units. Fix monotone pure strategies
for the other bidders and consider two bids for bidder i, ￿ b = (￿ b1;￿ b2) and b = (b1;b2); where
￿ bk > bk for k = 1;2: Suppose that when bidder i employs the high bid, ￿ b; he is certain to win
both units and pay ￿ p for each, while he is certain to win only one unit when he employs the
low bid, b: Further, suppose that the low bid yields a price for the one unit he wins that is
either p or p0 > p; each being equally likely. Thus, the expected di⁄erence in his payo⁄ from











ui(ti1 + ti2 ￿ 2￿ p) ￿ ui(ti1 ￿ p)
￿
:
Single-crossing requires this di⁄erence, when nonnegative, to remain nonnegative when bid-
der i￿ s type increases according to the coordinatewise partial order, i.e., when ti1 and ti2 in-
crease. But this can fail when risk aversion is strict because, whenever ti1+ti2￿2￿ p > ti1￿p0;
the ￿rst utility di⁄erence above strictly falls when ti1 increases. Consequently, the expected
di⁄erence can become negative if the second utility di⁄erence is negative to start with.
The economic intuition for the failure of single-crossing is straightforward. Under risk
aversion, the marginal utility of winning a second unit falls when the dollar value of a ￿rst
unit rises, giving the bidder an incentive to reduce his second unit bid so as to reduce the
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Figure 5.1: Types that are ordered with t0
i are bounded between two lines through t0
i, one
being vertical, the other having slope ￿i:
higher type is associated with a higher marginal utility of winning each additional unit.




i(m) ￿ 1 ￿ 0; and consider the partial order, ￿i; on Ti
de￿ned as follows: t0
i ￿i ti if,
1. t0
i1 ￿ ti1; and
2. t0
ik ￿ ￿i(t0
i1 + ::: + t0
ik￿1) ￿ tik ￿ ￿i(ti1 + ::: + tik￿1); for all k 2 f2;:::;mg:
(5.1)
Figure 5.1 shows the types that are greater than and less than a typical type, t0
i; when
types are two-dimensional, i.e., when m = 2:
Under the Euclidean metric and Borel sigma-algebra on the type space, the partial order
￿i de￿ned by (5.1) is clearly closed so that G.1 is satis￿ed. Because the marginal distribution
of each player￿ s type has a density, G.2 is satis￿ed as well. To see that G.3 is satis￿ed, let T 0
i
be the set of points in Ti with rational coordinates and suppose that
R
B fi(ti)dti > 0 for some
Borel subset B of Ti: Then B must have positive Lebesgue measure in Rm: Consequently, by
Fubini￿ s theorem, there exists z 2 Rm (indeed there is a positive Lebesgue measure of such
z￿ s) such that the line de￿ned by z+R((1+￿i);(1+￿i)2;:::;(1+￿i)m) intersects B in a set of
positive one-dimensional Lebesgue measure on the line. Therefore we may choose two distinct
points, ti and t0
i in B that are on this line. Hence, t0
i￿ti = ￿((1+￿i);(1+￿i)2;:::;(1+￿i)m),
where we may assume without loss that ￿ > 0: But then, t0




ik ￿ tik = ￿(1 + ￿i)
k
= ￿f1 + ￿i[1 + (1 + ￿i) + (1 + ￿i)
2 + ::: + (1 + ￿i)
k￿1]g
= ￿(1 + ￿i) + ￿i[￿(1 + ￿i) + ￿(1 + ￿i)
2 + ::: + ￿(1 + ￿i)
k￿1]
= ￿(1 + ￿i) + ￿i[(t
0
i1 ￿ ti1) + (t
0





i1 ￿ ti1) + (t
0
i2 ￿ ti2) + ::: + (t
0
ik￿1 ￿ tik￿1)]:
Consequently, for any t0
i 2 T 0







according to the partial order ￿i de￿ned by (5.1). Hence, G.3 is satis￿ed.
As noted in section 4.1, actions spaces, being ￿nite sublattices, are locally complete
compact metric semilattices. Hence, G.4 and G.5 (ii) hold. Also, G.6 holds because action
spaces are ￿nite. Thus, we have so far veri￿ed G.1-G.6.
McAdams (2004) shows that each bidder￿ s interim payo⁄ function is modular and hence
quasisupermodular. By condition 1 of Proposition 4.3, the hypotheses of Theorem 4.1 will
be satis￿ed if interim payo⁄s satisfy weak single crossing, which we now demonstrate. It is
here where the new partial order ￿i in (5.1) is fruitfully employed.
To verify weak single crossing it su¢ ces to show that ex-post payo⁄s satisfy increasing
di⁄erences. So, ￿x the strategies of the other bidders, a realization of their types, and an
ordering of the players for the purposes of tie-breaking. With these ￿xed, suppose that
the bid, ￿ b; chosen by bidder i of type ti wins k units at the price ￿ p per unit, while the
coordinatewise-lower bid, b; wins j ￿ k units at the price p ￿ ￿ p per unit. The di⁄erence in
i￿ s ex-post utility from bidding ￿ b versus b is then,
ui(ti1 + ::: + tik ￿ k￿ p) ￿ ui(ti1 + ::: + tij ￿ jp): (5.2)
Assuming that t0
i ￿i ti in the sense of (5.1), it su¢ ces to show that (5.2) is weakly greater
at t0
i than at ti: Noting that (5.1) implies that t0
il ￿ til for every l; it can be seen that, if
j = k; then (5.2), being negative, is weakly greater at t0
i than at ti by the concavity of ui. It
19therefore remains only to consider the case in which j < k; where we have,
ui(t
0
i1 + ::: + t
0























i1 + ::: + t
0
ij ￿ jp) ￿ ui(ti1 + ::: + tij ￿ jp);
where the ￿rst and fourth inequalities follow from the concavity of ui and because a bidder￿ s
surplus lies between m and ￿m; and the third inequality follows because t0
i ￿i ti in the sense
of (5.1). We conclude that weak single crossing holds and so the hypotheses of Theorem 4.1
are satis￿ed.
Finally, for each player i, let Ci denote the subset of his pure strategies such that for fi
almost-every ti; and for every k; bidder i￿ s kth unit-bid does not exceed ￿(tik), the smallest
feasible unit-bid greater than or equal to tik. By Remark 1, each Ci is join-closed, piecewise-
closed and pointwise-limit-closed. Further, because the hypotheses of Theorem 4.1 are satis-
￿ed, whenever the others employ monotone pure strategies player i has a monotone best reply,
b0
i(￿); say. De￿ning bi(ti) to be the coordinatewise minimum of b0
i(ti) and (￿(ti1);:::;￿(tim))
for all ti 2 Ti implies that bi(￿) is a monotone best reply contained in Ci: This is because,
ex-post, any units won by employing b0
i(￿) that are also won by employing bi(￿) are won at
a weakly lower price with bi(￿), and any units won by employing b0
i(￿) that are not won by
employing bi(￿) cannot be won at a positive surplus. Hence, the hypotheses of Theorem 4.2
are satis￿ed and we conclude that a nontrivial monotone pure strategy equilibrium exists.
We may therefore state the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1. Consider an independent private value uniform-price multi-unit auction
with the random-bidder-order tie-breaking rule and in which bids are restricted to a ￿nite
grid. Suppose that each bidder i￿ s vector of marginal values is decreasing and chosen ac-
cording to the density fi, and that each bidder is weakly risk averse.
Then, there is a pure strategy equilibrium of the auction with the following properties.
For each bidder i;
(i) the equilibrium is monotone under the type-space partial order ￿i de￿ned by (5.1)
and under the usual coordinatewise partial order on bids, and
(ii) the equilibrium is nontrivial in the sense that for fi almost-all of his types, and for
every k; bidder i￿ s kth unit-bid does not exceed the smallest feasible unit-bid greater than
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Figure 5.2: After performing the change of variable from ti to xi as described in Remark 4
bidder i￿ s new type space is triangle OAB and it is endowed with the coordinatewise partial
order. The ￿gure is drawn for the case in which ￿i 2 (0;1):
Remark 3. The partial order de￿ned by (5.1) reduces to the usual coordinatewise partial
order under risk neutrality (i.e., when ￿i = 0), but is distinct from the coordinatewise partial
order under strict risk aversion (i.e., when ￿i > 0), in which case McAdams (2003) does not
apply since he employs the coordinatewise partial order.
Remark 4. The partial order de￿ned by (5.1) can instead be thought of as a change of
variable from ti to say xi; where xi1 = ti1 and xik = tik ￿ ￿i(ti1 + ::: + tik￿1) for k > 1; and
where the coordinatewise partial order is applied to the new type space. Our results apply
equally well using this change-of-variable technique. In contrast, McAdams (2003) still does
not apply because the resulting type space is not the product of intervals, an assumption
he maintains together with a strictly positive joint density.40 See Figure 5.2 for the case in
which m = 2.
Remark 5. One can use the above technique to obtain the existence of a nontrivial monotone
pure strategy equilibrium when bidders￿types remain independent but their payo⁄s are in-
terdependent. For example, one can permit ui(
Pk
j=1 vij(tij;t￿i)￿kp) to be bidder i￿ s ex-post
utility of winning k units at price p when the joint type vector is t and where bidder i￿ s dollar
40Indeed, starting with the partial order de￿ned by (5.1) there is no change of variable that, when combined
with the coordinatewise partial order, is order-preserving and maps to a product of intervals. This is because,
in contrast to a product of intervals with the coordinatewise partial order, under the new partial order there
is never a smallest element of the type space and there is no largest element when ￿i > 1:
21value for a jth unit, vij(tij;t￿i), is strictly increasing in the jth coordinate of i￿ s type vector
and can depend in any way on all coordinates of the other bidders￿type vectors.
Finally, by considering ￿ner and ￿ner ￿nite grids of bids, one can permit unit-bids to be
any nonnegative real number. The proof of the following corollary of Proposition 5.1 is in
the appendix.
Corollary 5.2. The conclusions of Proposition 5.1 remain valid even when the bidders￿
unit-bids are permitted to be any nonnegative real number.
5.2. Discriminatory Multi-Unit Auctions with CARA Bidders
Consider the same setup as in Subsection 5.1 with two exceptions. First, change the payment
rule so that each bidder pays his kth unit-bid for a kth unit won. Second, assume that each
bidder￿ s utility function, ui; exhibits constant absolute risk aversion.
Despite these two changes, single-crossing still fails under the coordinatewise partial order
on types for the same underlying reason as in a uniform-price auction with risk averse bidders.
Nonetheless, just as in the previous section it can be shown here that assumptions G.1-G.6
hold and each bidder i￿ s interim expected payo⁄function satis￿es weak single-crossing under
the partial order ￿i; de￿ned in (5.1).41
For the remainder of this section, we employ the type-space partial order ￿i; de￿ned in
(5.1) and the coordinatewise partial order on the space of feasible bid vectors. Monotonicity
of pure strategies is then de￿ned in terms of these partial orders.
If it can be shown that interim expected payo⁄s are quasisupermodular, condition 1 of
Proposition 4.3 would permit us to apply Theorem 4.1. However, quasisupermodularity does
not hold in discriminatory auctions with strictly risk averse bidders ￿even CARA bidders.
The intuition for the failure of quasisupermodularity is as follows. Suppose there are two
units, and let bk denote a kth unit-bid. Fixing b2; suppose that b1 is chosen to maximize a
bidder￿ s interim payo⁄ when his type is (t1;t2), namely,
P1(b1)[u(t1 ￿ b1) ￿ u(0)] + P2(b2)[u((t1 ￿ b1) + (t2 ￿ b2)) ￿ u(t1 ￿ b1)];
where Pk(bk) is the probability of winning at least k units:
There are two bene￿ts from increasing b1. First, the probability, P1(b1); of winning at
least one unit increases. Second, when risk aversion is strict, the marginal utility, u((t1 ￿
b1) + (t2 ￿ b2)) ￿ u(t1 ￿ b1); of winning a second unit increases. The cost of increasing b1
is that the marginal utility, u(t1 ￿ b1) ￿ u(0), of winning a ￿rst unit decreases. Optimizing
41This statement remains true with any risk averse utility function. The CARA utility assumption is
required for a di⁄erent purpose which will be revealed shortly.
22over the choice of b1 balances this cost with the two bene￿ts. For simplicity, suppose that
the optimal choice of b1 satis￿es b1 > t2:
Now suppose that b2 increases. Indeed, suppose that b2 increases to t2: Then the marginal
utility of winning a second unit vanishes. Consequently, the second bene￿t from increasing
b1 is no longer present and the optimal choice of b1 may fall ￿ even with CARA utility.
This illustrates that the change in utility from increasing one￿ s ￿rst unit-bid may be
positive when one￿ s second unit-bid is low, but negative when one￿ s second unit-bid is high.
Thus, the di⁄erent coordinates of a bidder￿ s bid are not necessarily complementary, and weak
quasisupermodularity can fail. We therefore cannot appeal to condition 1 of Proposition 4.3.
Fortunately, we can instead appeal to condition 2 of Proposition 4.3 owing to the following
lemma, whose proof is in the appendix. It is here where we employ the assumption of CARA
utility.
Lemma 5.3. Fix any monotone pure strategies for other bidders and suppose that the
vector of bids bi is optimal for bidder i when his type vector is ti; and that b0
i is optimal
when his type is t0
i ￿i ti; where ￿i is the partial order de￿ned in (5.1). Then the vector of
bids bi _ b0
i is optimal when his type is t0
i:
Because Lemma 5.3 establishes condition 2 of Proposition 4.3, we may apply Theorem
4.1 to conclude that a monotone pure strategy equilibrium exists. Thus, despite the failure
￿even with CARA utilities ￿of both single-crossing with the coordinatewise partial order
on types and of weak quasisupermodularity with the coordinatewise partial order on bids,
we have established the following.
Proposition 5.4. Consider an independent private value discriminatory multi-unit auction
with the random-bidder-order tie-breaking rule and in which bids are restricted to a ￿nite
grid. Suppose that each bidder i￿ s vector of marginal values is decreasing and chosen ac-
cording to the density fi, and that each bidder is weakly risk averse and exhibits constant
absolute risk aversion.
Then, there is a pure strategy equilibrium that is monotone under the type-space partial
order ￿i de￿ned by (5.1) and under the usual coordinatewise partial order on bids.
Remark 6. As in Remark 5, similar techniques can be used to obtain the existence of
a monotone pure strategy equilibrium when bidders￿types remain independent but their
payo⁄s are interdependent.
The proof of the following corollary is in the appendix.
Corollary 5.5. The conlcusions of Proposition 5.4 remain valid even when the bidders￿unit
bids are permited to be any nonnegative real number.
23The two applications provided so far demonstrate that it is useful to have ￿ exibility in
de￿ning the partial order on the type space since the mathematically natural partial order
(in this case the coordinatewise partial order on the original type space) may not be the
partial order that corresponds best to the economics of the problem. The next application
shows that even when single crossing cannot be established for all coordinates of the type
space jointly, it is enough for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium if single-crossing
holds strictly even for a single coordinate of the type space.
5.3. Price Competition with Non-Substitutes
Consider an n-￿rm di⁄erentiated-product price-competition setting. Firm i chooses price
pi 2 [0;1]; and receives two pieces of private information ￿ his constant marginal cost,
ci 2 [0;1]; and information xi 2 [0;1] about the state of demand in each of the n markets.
The demand for ￿rm i￿ s product is Di(p;x) when the vector of prices chosen by all ￿rms
is p 2 [0;1]n and when their joint vector of private information about market demand is
x 2 [0;1]n: Demand functions are assumed to be twice continuously di⁄erentiable, strictly
positive when own-price is less than one, and strictly downward-sloping, i.e., @Di(p;x)=@pi <
0:
Some products may be substitutes, but others need not be. More precisely, the n ￿rms
are partitioned into two subsets N1 and N2.42 Products produced by ￿rms within each subset
are substitutes, and so we assume that Di(p;x) and @Di(p;x)=@pi are nondecreasing in pj
whenever i and j are in the same Nk. In addition, marginal costs are a¢ liated among ￿rms
within each Nk and are independent across the two subsets of ￿rms. The joint density of
costs is given by the continuously di⁄erentiable density f(c) on [0;1]n: Information about
market demand may be correlated across ￿rms, but is independent of all marginal costs and
has continuously di⁄erentiable joint density g(x) on [0;1]n: We do not assume that market
demands are nondecreasing in x because we wish to permit the possibility that information
that increases demand for some products might decrease it for others.
Given pure strategies pj(cj;xj) for the others, ￿rm i￿ s interim expected pro￿ts are,
vi(pi;ci;xi) =
Z

























42The extension to any ￿nite number of subsets is straightforward.







￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ci;xi
￿
> 0 (5.5)
for all pi;ci;xi 2 [0;1] such that pi ￿ ci; where the weak inequality follows because both
partial derivatives with respect to ci on the right-hand side of (5.4) are nonnegative. For
example, consider the expectation in the ￿rst partial derivative (the second is similar). If
i 2 N1; then
E(Dijci;xi) = E [E(Di(pi;p￿i(c￿i;x￿i);x)jci;xi;(cj;xj)j2N2)jci;xi]:
The inner expectation is nondecreasing in ci because the vector of marginal costs for ￿rms in
N1 are a¢ liated, their prices are nondecreasing in their costs, and their goods are substitutes.
That the entire expectation is nondecreasing in ci now follows from the independence of
(ci;xi) and (cj;xj)j2N2:
Thus, according to (5.5), when pi ￿ ci single-crossing holds strictly for the marginal
cost coordinate of the type space. On the other hand, single-crossing need not hold for the
market-demand coordinate, xi; since we have made no assumptions about how xi a⁄ects
demand.43 Nonetheless, we shall now de￿ne a partial order on ￿rm i￿ s type space Ti = [0;1]2
under which a monotone pure strategy equilibrium exists.
Note that, because ￿@Di=@pi is positive and continuous on its compact domain, it
is bounded strictly above zero with a bound that is independent of the pure strategies,
pj(cj;xj) employed by other ￿rms. Hence, because our continuity assumptions imply that
@2vi(pi;ci;xi)=@xi@pi is bounded, there exists ￿i > 0 such that for all ￿ 2 [0;￿i] and all pure







for all pi;ci;xi 2 [0;1] such that pi ￿ ci:





is strictly increasing along lines in (ci;xi)-space with slope ￿ 2 [0;￿i]: This provides a basis
43We cannot simply restrict attention to strategies pi(ci;xi) that are monotone in ci and jointly measurable
in (ci;xi) because this set of pure strategies is not compact in a topology rendering ex-ante payo⁄s continuous.
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Figure 5.3: Types that are greater than and less than t0
i are bounded between two lines
through t0
i, one being horizontal, the other having slope ￿i:
for de￿ning a partial order under which players possess monotone best replies.





i ￿ ￿ici ￿ xi and x0
i ￿ xi: Figure 5.3 shows those types greater than and less than




Under the partial order ￿i; assumptions G.1-G.3 hold as in Example 5.1. The action-
space assumption G.4 clearly holds while G.5 (ii) holds by Lemma A.19 given the usual
partial order over the reals. Assumption G.6 holds by our continuity assumption on demand.
Also, because the action space [0;1] is totally ordered, the set of monotone best replies is
join-closed because the join of two best replies is, at every ti; equal to one of them or to the
other. Finally, as is shown in the Appendix (see Lemma A.22), under the type-space partial
order, ￿i; ￿rm i possesses a monotone best reply when the others employ monotone pure
strategies.
Therefore, by Theorem 4.1, there exists a pure strategy equilibrium in which each ￿rm￿ s
price is monotone in (ci;xi) according to ￿i : In particular, there is a pure strategy equi-
librium in which each ￿rm￿ s price is nondecreasing in his marginal cost, the coordinate in
which strict single-crossing holds.
5.4. Type Spaces with Atoms
When type spaces contain atoms, assumption G.2 fails and there may not exist a pure
strategy equilibrium, let alone a monotone pure strategy equilibrium. Thus, one must permit
mixing and we show here how our results can be used to ensure the existence of a monotone
mixed strategy equilibrium.
Because we do not make the Milgrom and Weber (1985) assumption that the joint dis-
26tribution of types is absolutely continuous with respect to the product of its marginals,
it is not useful to de￿ne mixed strategies as distributional strategies. For our purposes,
the most direct route is to instead follow Aumann (1964) and de￿ne a mixed strategy for
player i to be a measurable function, mi : Ti ￿ [0;1] ! Ai; where [0;1] is endowed with
Borel sigma-algebra B; and Ti ￿ [0;1] is endowed with product sigma-algebra Ti ￿ B: As in
Aumann (1964), mixed strategies m1;:::;mN for the N players are implemented as follows.
The players￿types t1;:::;tN are drawn jointly according to ￿ and then, independently, each
player i privately draws !i from [0;1] according to a uniform distribution. Player i knowing





[0;1]N ui(m(t;!);t)d!d￿; where m(t;!) = (m1(t1;!1);:::;m1(tN;!N)):
Call a mixed strategy mi : Ti ￿[0;1] ! Ai monotone if the image of mi(ti;￿); i.e., the set
mi(ti;[0;1]); is a totally ordered subset of Ai for every ti 2 Ti and if every member of the
image of mi(ti;￿) is greater than or equal to every member of the image of mi(t0
i;￿) whenever
ti ￿ t0
i.44 The following result permits a player￿ s marginal type-distribution to contain atoms,
even countably many.
Theorem 5.6. If G.1 and G.3-G.6 hold, and each player￿ s set of monotone pure best replies
is nonempty and join-closed whenever the others employ monotone mixed strategies, then
G possesses a monotone mixed strategy equilibrium.
Proof. For each player i; let T ￿
i denote the set of atoms of ￿i:45 Consider the following
surrogate Bayesian game. Player i￿ s type space is Qi = [(TinT ￿
i )￿f0g][(T ￿
i ￿[0;1]) and the
sigma-algebra on Qi is generated by all sets of the form (BnT ￿
i )￿f0g and (B \ T ￿
i )￿C; where
B 2 Ti and C is a Borel subset of [0;1]: The joint distribution on types, ￿; is determined
as follows. Nature ￿rst chooses t 2 T according to the original type distribution ￿: Then,
for each i; Nature independently and uniformly chooses xi 2 [0;1] if ti 2 T ￿
i ; and chooses
xi = 0 if ti 2 TinT ￿
i :46 Hence, ￿i; the marginal distribution on Qi is atomless. Player i is
informed of qi = (ti;xi): Action spaces are unchanged. The xi are payo⁄ irrelevant and so
payo⁄ functions are as before. This completes the description of the surrogate game.
The partial order on Qi is the lexicographic partial order. That is, q0
i = (t0
i;x0
i) ￿ (ti;xi) =
qi if either t0
i ￿ ti and t0
i 6= ti; or t0
i = ti and x0
i ￿ xi: The metrics and partial orders on the
players￿action spaces are unchanged.
44A subset of a partially ordered space is totally ordered if any two members are ordered. Such a subset
is sometimes also called a chain.
45For every ti 2 Ti; the singleton set ftig is in Ti by G.1. See Section A.1 in the Appendix.
46In particular, if for each player i; Bi 2 Ti and Ci is a Borel subset of [0;1]; and D = ￿i2I[(BinT￿
i )￿f0g]￿
￿i2Ic[(Bi \ T￿
i ) ￿ Ci]; then ￿(D) = ￿([￿i2I (BinT￿
i )] ￿ [￿i2Ic (Bi \ T￿
i )])￿i2Ic￿(Ci); where ￿ is Lebesgue
measure on [0;1]:
27It is straightforward to show that under the hypotheses above, all the hypotheses of
Theorem 4.1 but perhaps G.3 hold in the surrogate game.47 We now show that G.3 too
holds in the surrogate game.
For each player i; let T 0
i denote the countable subset of Ti that can be used to verify G.3 in
the original game and de￿ne the countable set Q0
i = [T 0
i ￿ f0g][[T ￿
i ￿ R]; where R denotes
the set of rationals in [0;1]. Suppose that for some player i, ￿i(B) > 0 for some measurable
subset B of Qi: Then either ￿i(B \ [(TinT ￿
i ) ￿ f0g]) > 0 or ￿i(B \ (ft￿
ig ￿ [0;1])) > 0 for
some t￿
i 2 T ￿
i : In the former case, ￿i(fti 2 TinT ￿
i : (ti;0) 2 Bg) > 0 and G.3 in the original
game implies the existence of t0
i and t00
i in fti 2 TinT 0
i : (ti;0) 2 Bg and t0









to the lexicographic partial order on Qi and where (t00
i;0) and (t0
i;0) are in B and (t0
i;0) is
in Q0
i: In the latter case there exist x0
i; xi in [0;1] with x0




i) are in B: But for any rational r between x0





according to the lexicographic order on Qi and where (t￿
i;r) is in Q0
i: Thus, the surrogate
game satis￿es G.3 and we may conclude, by Theorem 4.1, that it possesses a monotone
pure strategy equilibrium. But any such equilibrium induces a monotone mixed strategy
equilibrium of the original game.
Remark 7. The proof of Theorem 5.6 in fact demonstrates that players need only randomize
when their type is an atom.
6. Proof of Theorem 4.1
Let Mi denote the nonempty set of monotone functions from Ti into Ai, and let M =
￿N
i=1Mi: By Lemma A:11; every element of Mi is equal ￿i almost-everywhere to a measurable
monotone function, and so Mi coincides with player i￿ s set of monotone pure strategies. Let
Bi : M￿i ￿ Mi denote player i￿ s best-reply correspondence when all players must employ
monotone pure strategies. Because, by hypothesis, each player possesses a monotone best
reply (among all strategies) when the others employ monotone pure strategies, any ￿xed
point of ￿n
i=1Bi : M ￿ M is a monotone pure strategy equilibrium. The following steps
demonstrate that such a ￿xed point exists.
STEP I. (M is a nonempty, compact, metric, absolute retract.) Without loss, we may
assume for each player i that the metric di on Ai is bounded:48 Given di; de￿ne a metric ￿i
47Observe that a monotone pure strategy in the surrogate game induces a monotone mixed strategy in the
original game, and that a monotone pure strategy in the original game de￿nes a monotone pure strategy in
the surrogate game by viewing it to be constant in xi:
48For any metric, d(￿;￿); a topologically equivalent bounded metric is min(1;d(￿;￿)):









By Lemmas A.13 and A.16, each (Mi;￿i) is a compact absolute retract.50 Consequently,
under the product topology ￿metrized by the sum of the ￿i ￿M is a nonempty compact
metric space and, by Borsuk (1966) IV (7.1), an absolute retract.
STEP II. (￿n
i=1Bi is nonempty-valued and upper-hemicontinuous.) We ￿rst demonstrate
that, given the metric spaces (Mj;￿j); each player i￿ s payo⁄ function, Ui : M ! R; is
continuous under the product topology. To see this, suppose that sn is a sequence of joint
strategies in M; and that sn ! s 2 M: By Lemma A.12, for each player i; sn
i (ti) ! si(ti) for
￿i almost every ti 2 Ti. Consequently, sn(t) ! s(t) for ￿ almost every t 2 T:51 Hence, since










establishing the continuity of Ui:
Because each Mi is compact, Berge￿ s theorem of the maximum implies that Bi : M￿i ￿
Mi is nonempty-valued and upper-hemicontinuous. Hence, ￿n
i=1Bi is nonempty-valued and
upper-hemicontinuous as well.
STEP III. (￿n
i=1Bi is contractible-valued.) According to Lemma A.3, for each player i;
assumptions G.1-G.3 imply the existence of a monotone and measurable function ￿i : Ti !
[0;1] such that ￿ifti 2 Ti : ￿i(ti) = cg = 0 for every c 2 [0;1]: Fixing such a function ￿i
permits the construction of a contraction map.52
Fix some monotone pure strategy, s￿i; for players other than i, and consider player i￿ s
set of monotone pure best replies, Bi(s￿i). Because Bi(￿) is upper-hemicontinuous, it is
closed-valued and therefore Bi(s￿i) is compact, being a closed subset of the compact metric
space Mi: By hypothesis, Bi(s￿i) is join-closed, and so Bi(s￿i) is a compact semilattice
under the partial order de￿ned by si ￿ s0
i if si(ti) ￿ s0
i(ti) for ￿i-a.e. ti 2 Ti. By Lemma
A.12, this partial order is closed. Therefore, Lemma A.6 implies that Bi(s￿i) is a complete
49Formally, the resulting metric space (Mi;￿i) is the space of equivalence classes of functions in Mi that
are equal ￿i almost everywhere ￿i.e., two functions are in the same equivalence class if the set on which
they coincide contains a measurable subset having ￿i-measure one. Nevertheless, analogous to the standard
treatment of Lp spaces, in the interest of notational simplicity we focus on the elements of the original space
Mi rather than on the equivalence classes themselves.
50One cannot improve upon Lemma A.16 by proving, for example, that Mi; metrized by ￿i; is homeomor-
phic to a convex set. It need not be (e.g., see footnote 24).
51This is because if Q1;:::;Qn are such that ￿(Qi ￿T￿i) = ￿i(Qi) = 1 for all i; then ￿(￿iQi) = ￿(\i(Qi ￿
T￿i)) = 1:
52For example, if Ti = [0;1]2 and ￿i is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, we may
take ￿i(ti) = (ti1 + ti2)=2:
29semilattice so that ~ si = _Bi(s￿i) is a well-de￿ned member of Bi(s￿i). Consequently for
every si 2 Bi(s￿i), ~ si(ti) ￿ si(ti) for ￿i-a.e. ti 2 Ti: By Lemma A.14, there exists ￿ si 2 Mi
such that ￿ si(ti) = ~ si(ti) for ￿i-a.e. ti ￿and hence ￿ si 2 Bi(s￿i) ￿and such that ￿ si(ti) ￿ si(ti)
for every ti 2 Ti and every si that is ￿i-a.e. less or equal to ~ si and therefore in particular for
every si 2 Bi(s￿i):53





if ￿i(ti) ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ and ￿ < 1
otherwise.
(6.1)
Note that h(0;si) = si; h(1;si) = ￿ si; and h(￿;si)(ti) is always either ￿ si(ti) or si(ti) and
so is an interim best reply for ￿i almost every ti. Moreover, h(￿;si) is monotone because ￿i
is monotone and ￿ si(ti) ￿ si(ti) for all ti 2 Ti: Hence, h(￿;si) 2 Bi(s￿i): Therefore, h will be
a contraction for Bi(s￿i) and Bi(s￿i) will be contractible if h(￿;si) is continuous, which we
establish next.54
Suppose ￿n 2 [0;1] converges to ￿ and sn
i 2 Bi(s￿i) converges to si; both as n ! 1: By
Lemma A.12, there is a measurable subset, D; of i￿ s types such that ￿i(D) = 1 and for all
ti 2 D; sn
i (ti) ! si(ti): Consider any ti 2 D: There are three cases: (a) ￿i(ti) < 1 ￿ ￿; (b)
￿i(ti) > 1 ￿ ￿; and (c) ￿i(ti) = 1 ￿ ￿: In case (a), ￿ < 1 and ￿i(ti) < 1 ￿ ￿n for n large
enough and so h(￿n;sn
i )(ti) = sn
i (ti) ! si(ti) = h(￿;si): In case (b), ￿i(ti) > 1 ￿ ￿n for n
large enough and so for such large enough n; h(￿n;sn
i )(ti) = ￿ si(ti) = h(￿;si)(ti): Because
the remaining case (c) occurs only if ti is in a set of types having ￿i-measure zero, we have
shown that h(￿n;sn
i )(ti) ! h(￿;si)(ti) for ￿i-a.e. ti; which, by Lemma A.12 implies that
h(￿n;sn
i ) ! h(￿;si); establishing the continuity of h:
Thus, for each player i; the correspondence Bi : M￿i ￿ Mi is contractible-valued. Under
the product topology, ￿n
i=1Bi is therefore contractible-valued as well.
Steps I-III establish that ￿n
i=1Bi satis￿es the hypotheses of Theorem 2.1 and therefore
possesses a ￿xed point.
Remark 8. The proof of Theorem 4.2 mimics that of Theorem 4.1, but where each Mi is
replaced with Mi \ Ci; and where each correspondence Bi : M￿i ￿ Mi is replaced with
53One might wonder why we do not take the more driect route of de￿ning, for each ti 2 Ti; ￿ si(ti) = _si(ti),
where the join is taken over all si 2 Bi(s￿i). It is because one must show using an argument such as that
given here that ￿ si is in Bi(s￿i); which is not obvious by virtue of the direct de￿nition alone since each
member of Bi(s￿i) is an interim best reply only ￿i almost everywhere.
54With ￿i de￿ned as in footnote 52, Figure 6.1 provides snapshots of the resulting h(￿;si) as ￿ moves from
zero to one. The axes are the two dimensions of the type vector (ti1;ti2); and the arrow within the ￿gures
depicts the direction in which the negatively-sloped line, (ti1 + ti2)=2 = 1 ￿ ￿; moves as ￿ increases. For
example, panel (a) shows that when ￿ = 0; h(￿;si)(ti) is equal to si(ti) for all ti in the unit square. On the
other hand, panel (c) shows that when ￿ = 3=4; h(￿;si)(ti) is equal to si(ti) for ti below the negatively-sloped
line and equal to ￿ si(ti) for ti above it.
303/4 Ĳ (c) = 1 Ĳ (d) =
i s
0 Ĳ (a) =
i s





Figure 6.1: h(￿;si) as ￿ varies from 0 (panel (a)) to 1 (panel (d)) and the domain is the unit
square.
the correspondence B￿
i : M￿i \ C￿i ￿ Mi \ Ci de￿ned by B￿
i(s￿i) = Bi(s￿i) \ Ci: The
proof goes through because the hypotheses of Theorem 4.2 imply that each Mi \ Ci is
compact, nonempty, join-closed, piecewise-closed, and pointwise-limit-closed (and hence the
proof that each Mi \ Ci is an absolute retract mimics the proof of Lemma A.16), and that
each correspondence B￿
i is upper-hemicontinuous, nonempty-valued and contractible-valued
(the contraction is once again de￿ned by 6.1). The result then follows from Theorem 2.1.
A. Appendix
To simplify the notation, we drop the subscript i from Ti; ￿i; and Ai throughout the appendix.
Thus, in this appendix, T; ￿; and A should be thought of as the type space, marginal
distribution, and action space, respectively, of any one of the players, not as the joint type
spaces, joint distribution, and joint action spaces of all the players. Of course, the theorems
that follow are correct with either interpretation, but in the main text we apply the theorems
below to the players individually rather than jointly and so the former interpretation is the
more relevant. For convenience, we rewrite here without subscripts the assumptions from
section 3.2 that will be used in this appendix.
G.1 T is endowed with a sigma-algebra of subsets, T ; a measurable partial order, and a
countably additive probability measure ￿:
G.2 The probability measure ￿ is atomless.
G.3 There is a countable subset T 0 of T such that every set in T assigned positive probability
by ￿ contains two points between which lies a point in T 0:
G.4 A is a compact metric space and a semilattice with a closed partial order.
31G.5 Either (i) A is a convex subset of a locally convex linear topological space, and the
partial order on A is convex, or (ii) A is a locally-complete metric semilattice.
A.1. Partially Ordered Measure Spaces
Preliminaries. We say that ￿ = (T;T ;￿;￿) is a partially ordered probability space if G.1
holds, i.e., if T is a sigma-algebra of subsets of T; ￿ is a measurable partial order on T, and
￿ is a countably additive probability measure with domain T . If, in addition, G.2 holds, we
say that ￿ is a partially ordered atomless probability space.
If ￿ = (T;T ;￿;￿) is a partially ordered probability space, Lemma 7.6.1 of Cohn (1980)
implies that the sets ￿(t) = ft0 2 T : t0 ￿ t) and ￿(t) = ft0 2 T : t ￿ t0g are in T for
each t 2 T: Hence, for all t;t0 2 T; the interval [t;t0] = ft00 2 T : t0 ￿ t00 ￿ tg is a member
of T , being the intersection of ￿(t) and ￿(t0). In particular, the singleton set ftg; being a
degenerate interval, is a member of T for every t 2 T:
Lemma A.1. Suppose that (T;T ;￿;￿) is a partially ordered probability space satisfying
G.3 and that D 2 T has positive measure under ￿:Then there are sequences, ftng1
n=1 in T 0
and ft0
ng1




Proof. For each of the countably many t0 in T 0; remove from D all members of ￿(t0) if
D\ ￿(t0) has ￿-measure zero and remove from D all members of ￿(t0) if D\ ￿(t0) has
￿-measure zero. Having removed from D countably many subsets each with ￿-measure zero,
we are left with a set D0 with the same positive measure as D: Applying G.3 to D0; there
exist t;t0 in D0 and ~ t1 in T 0 such that t0 ￿ ~ t1 ￿ t: Hence, t0 is a member of both D0 and
￿(~ t1) implying that ￿(D\ ￿(~ t1)) > 0; and t is a member of both D0 and ￿(~ t1) implying
that ￿(D\ ￿(~ t1)) > 0:
Setting D0 = D; we may inductively apply the same argument, for each k ￿ 1; to the
positive ￿-measure set Dk = Dk￿1\ ￿(~ tk), yielding ~ tk+1 2 T 0 such that ￿(Dk\ ￿(~ tk+1)) > 0
and ￿(Dk\ ￿(~ tk+1)) > 0:
De￿ne the sequence ftng1
n=1 in T 0 by setting tn = ~ t3n￿2 and de￿ne the sequence ft0
ng1
n=1
in D by letting t0
n be any member of D \ [~ t3n￿1;~ t3n]: The latter set is always nonempty
because for every k ￿ 1;
￿(D \ [~ tk;~ tk+1]) ￿ ￿([Dk￿1\ ￿ (~ tk)]\ ￿ (~ tk+1)])
= ￿(Dk\ ￿ (~ tk+1))
> 0; (A.1)
where the ￿rst line follows because D contains Dk￿1 and the second line follows from the
de￿nition of Dk: Hence the two sequences, ftng in T 0 and ft0
ng in D; are well-de￿ned.
Finally, for every n ￿ 1; (A.1) implies ￿([tn;t0
n]) ￿ ￿([~ t3n￿2;~ t3n￿1]) ￿ ￿(D\[~ t3n￿2;~ t3n￿1]) >
0 and ￿([t0
n;tn+1]) ￿ ￿([~ t3n;~ t3n+1]) ￿ ￿(D \ [~ t3n;~ t3n+1]) > 0; as desired.
Corollary A.2. Under the hypotheses of Lemma A.1, if ￿([a;b]) > 0 then ￿([a;t￿]) > 0 and
￿([t￿;b]) > 0 for some t￿ 2 T 0:
Proof. Let D = [a;b] and obtain sequences ftng in T 0 and ft0
ng in [a;b] satisfying the conclu-
sion of Lemma A.1. Then letting t￿ = t2 2 T 0 for example, yields ￿([a;t￿]) ￿ ￿([t0
1;t2]) > 0
32where the ￿rst inequality follows because t0
1 2 [a;b] implies [a;t￿] contains [t0
1;t￿] = [t0
1;t2];
and ￿([t￿;b]) ￿ ￿([t2;t0
2]) > 0 where the ￿rst inequality follows because t0




Lemma A.3. If (T;T ;￿;￿) is a partially ordered atomless probability space satisfying G.3,
then there is a monotone and measurable function ￿ : T ! [0;1] such that ￿(￿￿1(￿)) = 0
for every ￿ 2 [0;1]:







Clearly, ￿ is monotone and measurable, being the pointwise convergent sum of monotone
and measurable functions. It remains to show that ￿(￿￿1(￿)) = 0 for every ￿ 2 [0;1]:
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that ￿(￿￿1(￿)) > 0: Because ￿ is atomless, ￿(￿￿1(￿)nT 0) =
￿(￿￿1(￿)) > 0 and so applying G.3 to ￿￿1(￿)nT 0 yields t0;t00 in ￿￿1(￿)nT 0 and tk 2 T 0
such that t00 ￿ tk ￿ t0: But then ￿ = ￿(t00) ￿ ￿(t0) + 2￿k > ￿(t0) = ￿; a contradiction.
A.2. Semilattices
The standard proofs of the next two lemmas are omitted.
Lemma A.4. If G.4 holds, and an;bn;cn are sequences in A such that an ￿ bn ￿ cn for
every n and both an and cn converge to a; then bn converges to a.
Lemma A.5. If G.4 holds, then every nondecreasing sequence and every nonincreasing
sequence in A converges.
Lemma A.6. If G.4 holds, then A is a complete semilattice.
Proof. Let S be a nonempty subset of A: Because A is a compact metric space, S has
a countable dense subset, fa1;a2;:::g: Let a￿ = limn a1 _ ::: _ an; where the limit exists by
Lemma A.5. Suppose that b 2 A is an upper bound for S and let a be an arbitrary element
of S: Then, some sequence, ank; converges to a: Moreover, ank ￿ a1 _ a2 _ ::: _ ank ￿ b for
every k: Taking the limit as k ! 1 yields a ￿ a￿ ￿ b: Hence, a￿ = _S:
A.3. The Space of Monotone Functions from T into A
In this subsection we introduce a metric, ￿; under which the space M of monotone functions
from T into A will be shown to be a compact metric space. Further, it will be shown that
under suitable conditions, the metric space (M;￿) is an absolute retract. Some preliminary
results are required.
Recall that a property P(t) is said to hold for ￿-a.e. t 2 T if the set of t 2 T on which P(t)
holds contains a measurable subset having ￿-measure one. We next introduce an important
de￿nition.
De￿nition A.7. Given a partially ordered probability space ￿ = (T;T ;￿;￿) and a par-
tially ordered metric space A; say that a monotone function f : T ! A is ￿ quasi-continuous
at t 2 T if there are sequences ftng and ft0
ng in T such that limn f(tn) = limn f(t0
n) = f(t)
and the intervals [tn;t] and [t;t0
n] have positive ￿-measure for every n:
33Remark 9. (i) The positive measure condition implies that the intervals are nonempty, i.e.,
that t0
n ￿ t ￿ tn for every n: (ii) Because we have not endowed T with a topology, neither
ftng nor ft0
ng is required to converge. (iii) f is ￿ quasi-continuous at every atom t of ￿
because we may set tn = t0
n = t for all n:
Lemma A.8. Suppose that ￿ = (T;T ;￿;￿) is a partially ordered probability space satis-
fying G.3, that A satis￿es G.4, and that f : T ! A is measurable and monotone. Then the
set of points at which f is ￿ quasi-continuous is measurable.
Proof. Suppose that f is ￿ quasi-continuous at t 2 T and that the sequences ftng and
ft0
ng satisfy the conditions in De￿nition A.7. Then, by Corollary A.2, for each n there
exist ~ tn;~ t0
n in T 0 such that the intervals [tn;~ tn] [~ tn;t]; [t;~ t0
n]; and [~ t0
n;t0
n] each have positive
￿-measure. In particular, tn ￿ ~ tn ￿ t implies f(tn) ￿ f(~ tn) ￿ f(t) and t ￿ ~ t0
n ￿ t0
n implies
f(t) ￿ f(~ t0
n) ￿ f(t0
n): Consequently, by Lemma A.4, limn f(~ tn) = limn f(~ t0
n) = f(t): We
conclude that the de￿nition of ￿ quasi-continuity at any t 2 T would be unchanged if the
sequences ftng and ft0
ng were required to be in T 0:













Then according to the conclusion drawn in the preceding paragraph, the set of points at







Consequently, it su¢ ces to show that each T n
t1;t2 is measurable, and for this it su¢ ces to show
that, as functions of t; the functions ￿([t1;t]); ￿([t;t2]); d(f(t1);f(t)); and d(f(t2);f(t)) are
measurable.
The functions d(f(t1);f(t)) and d(f(t2);f(t)) are measurable in t because the metric d
is continuous in its arguments and f is measurable. For the measurability of ￿([t1;t]); let
E = f(t0;t00) 2 T ￿ T : t0 ￿ t00g \ (T￿ ￿(t1)): Then E is in T ￿ T by the measurability of
￿; and [t1;t] = Et is the slice of E in which the ￿rst coordinate is t: Proposition 5.1.2 of
Cohn (1980) states that ￿(Et) is measurable in t: A similar argument shows that ￿([t;t2]) is
measurable in t:
Lemma A.9. Suppose that G.1, G.3 and G.4 hold, i.e., that ￿ = (T;T ;￿;￿) is a partially
ordered probability space satisfying G.3 and that A satis￿es G.4. If f : T ! A is measurable
and monotone, then f is ￿ quasi-continuous at ￿-a.e. t 2 T:
Proof. Let D denote the set of discontinuity points of f: By Lemma A.8, D is a member of
T : It su¢ ces to show that ￿(D) = 0:
De￿ne T n











and suppose, by way of contradiction, that ￿(D) > 0: Then, for some N ￿ 1; ￿(DN) > 0;





34Let d denote the metric on A: Then for every t 2 DN and every t1;t2 2 T 0 such that the








By Lemma A.1, there are sequences, ftng1
n=1 in T 0 and ft0
ng1
n=1 in DN; such that ￿ assigns
positive measure to the intervals [tn;t0
n] and [t0
n;tn+1] for every n: Consequently, for every n;












On the other hand, because for every n the intervals [tn;t0
n] and [t0
n;tn+1]; having positive
￿-measure, are nonempty, we have t1 ￿ t0
1 ￿ t2 ￿ t0




1) ￿ f(t2) ￿ f(t
0
2) ￿ :::
is a monotone sequence of points in A and must therefore converge by Lemma A.5. But
then both d(f(tn);f(t0
n)) and d(f(tn+1);f(t0
n)) converge to zero, contradicting (A.4), and so
we conclude that ￿(D) = 0:
Lemma A.10. (A Generalized Helly Selection Theorem). Suppose that G.1, G.3 and G.4
hold, i.e., that ￿ = (T;T ;￿;￿) is a partially ordered probability space satisfying G.3 and
that A satis￿es G.4. If fn : T ! A is a sequence of monotone functions ￿not necessarily
measurable ￿then there is a subsequence, fnk; and a measurable monotone function, f :
T ! A; such that fnk(t) !k f(t) for ￿-a.e. t 2 T:
Proof. Let T 0 = ft1;t2;:::g be the countable subset of T satisfying G.3. Choose a subse-
quence, fnk; of fn such that, for every i; limk fnk(ti) exists. De￿ne f(ti) = limk fnk(ti) for
every i; and extend f to all of T by de￿ning f(t) = _fa 2 A : a ￿ f(ti) for all ti ￿ tg.55
By Lemma A.6, this is well de￿ned because fa 2 A : a ￿ f(ti) for all ti ￿ tg is non-
empty for each t since it contains any limit point of fnk(t): Indeed, if fnkj(t) !j a; then
a = limj fnkj(t) ￿ limj fnkj(ti) = f(ti) for every ti ￿ t: Further, as required, the exten-
sion to T is monotone and leaves the values of f on ft1;t2;:::g unchanged, where the latter
follows because the monotonicity of f on ft1;t2;:::g implies that fa 2 A : a ￿ f(ti) for all
ti ￿ tkg = fa 2 A : a ￿ f(tk)g: To see that f is measurable, note ￿rst that f(t) = limm gm(t);
where gm(t) = _fa 2 A : a ￿ f(ti) for all i = 1;:::;m such that ti ￿ tg, and where the limit
exists by Lemma A.5. Because the partial order on T is measurable, each gm is a measurable
simple function. Hence, f is measurable, being the pointwise limit of measurable functions.
Let f be ￿ quasi-continuous at t 2 T: By Lemma A.9, it su¢ ces to show that fnk(t) !
f(t): So, suppose that fnkj(t) ! a 2 A for some subsequence nkj of nk: By the compactness
of A; it su¢ ces to show that a = f(t):
Because f is ￿ quasi-continuous at t 2 T; the argument in the ￿rst paragraph of the
proof of Lemma A.8 implies that there exist sequences fting and ft0
ing in T 0 such that
limn f(tin) = limn f(t0
in) = f(t) and such that the intervals [tin;t] and [t;t0
in] have positive
￿-measure for every n: In particular, the intervals [tin;t] and [t;t0
in] are always nonempty and
55Hence, f(t) = _A if no ti ￿ t:
35so tin ￿ t ￿ t0
in, implying by the monotonicity of each fnk that,
fnk(tin) ￿ fnk(t) ￿ fnk(t
0
in)
for every k and n: Because the partial order on A is closed, taking the limit ￿rst in k yields,
f(tin) ￿ a ￿ f(t
0
in);
and taking the limit next in n yields
f(t) ￿ a ￿ f(t);
from which we conclude that a = f(t); as desired.
By setting ffng in Lemma A.10 equal to a constant sequence, we obtain the following.
Lemma A.11. Under G.1, G.3 and G.4, every monotone function from T into A is ￿ almost
everywhere equal to a measurable monotone function.
We now introduce a metric on M; the space of monotone functions from T into A. Denote
the metric on A by d and assume without loss that d(a;b) ￿ 1 for all a;b 2 A: De￿ne the





which is well-de￿ned by Lemma A.11.
Formally, the resulting metric space (M;￿) is the space of equivalence classes of monotone
functions that are equal ￿ almost everywhere ￿i.e., two functions are in the same equivalence
class if there is a measurable subset of T having ￿-measure one on which they coincide.
Nevertheless, and analogous to the standard treatment of Lp spaces, we focus on the elements
of the original space M rather than on the equivalence classes themselves.
Lemma A.12. Under G.1, G.3 and G.4, ￿(fk;f) ! 0 if and only if d(fk(t);f(t)) ! 0 for
￿-a.e. t 2 T:
Proof. (only if) Suppose that ￿(fk;f) ! 0: By Lemma A.9, it su¢ ces to show that
fk(t) ! f(t) for all ￿ quasi-continuity points, t; of f:
Let t0 be a ￿ quasi-continuity point of f: Because A is compact, it su¢ ces to show that
an arbitrary convergent subsequence, fkj(t0); of fk(t0) converges to f(t0). So, suppose that
fkj(t0) converges to a 2 A: By Lemma A.10, there is a further subsequence, fk0
j of fkj and
a monotone measurable function, g : T ! A such that fk0
j(t) ! g(t) for ￿ a.e. t in T:
Because d is bounded, the dominated convergence theorem implies that ￿(fk0
j;g) ! 0: But
￿(fk0
j;f) ! 0 then implies that ￿(f;g) = 0 and so fk0
j(t) ! f(t) for ￿ a.e. t in T:




T such that limn f(tn) = limn f(t0
n) = f(t0) and the intervals [tn;t0] and [t0;t0
n] have positive
￿-measure for every n ￿ 1:
Consequently, because fk0
j(t) ! f(t) for ￿ a.e. t in T and because the intervals [tn;t0] and
[t0;t0
n] have positive ￿-measure, for every n there exist ~ tn and ~ t0




j(~ tn) !j f(~ tn) and fk0
j(~ t0
n) !j f(~ t0
n). Consequently, fk0




and taking the limit as j ! 1 yields f(~ tn) ￿ a ￿ f(~ t0
n); so that f(tn) ￿ f(~ tn) ￿ a ￿ f(~ t0
n) ￿
36f(t0
n) and therefore f(tn) ￿ a ￿ f(t0
n): Taking the limit of the latter inequality as n ! 1
yields f(t0) ￿ a ￿ f(t0); so that a = f(t0); as desired.
(if) To complete the proof, suppose that fk(t) converges to f(t) for ￿-a.e. t 2 T: Then,
because d is bounded, the dominated convergence theorem implies that ￿(fk;f) ! 0:
Combining Lemmas A.10 and A.12 we obtain the following.
Lemma A.13. Under G.1, G.3 and G.4, the metric space (M;￿) is compact.
Lemma A.14. Suppose that G.1, G.3 and G.4 hold and f : T ! A is monotone. If for every
t 2 T; ￿ f(t) = _g(t); where the join is taken over all monotone g : T ! A s.t. g(t) ￿ f(t) for
￿-a.e. t 2 T; then ￿ f : T ! A is monotone and ￿ f(t) = f(t) for ￿-a.e. t 2 T:56
Proof. Note that ￿ f(t) is well-de￿ned for each t 2 T by Lemma A.6, and ￿ f is monotone,
being the pointwise join of monotone functions. It remains only to show that ￿ f(t) = f(t) for
￿-a.e. t 2 T:
Suppose ￿rst that f is measurable. Let C denote the measurable (by Lemma A.8) set of
￿ quasi-continuity points of f; and let Lf denote the set of monotone g : T ! A such that
g(t) ￿ f(t) for ￿-a.e. t 2 T: By Lemma A.9, ￿(C) = 1:
We claim that f(t) ￿ g(t) for every t 2 C and every g 2 Lf: To see this, ￿x g 2 Lf
and let D be a measurable set with ￿-measure one such that g(t) ￿ f(t) for every t 2 D:
Consider t 2 C: Because t is a ￿ quasi-continuity point of f; there are sequences ftng and
ft0
ng in T such that limn f(tn) = limn f(t0
n) = f(t) and such that the intervals [tn;t] and
[t;t0
n] have positive ￿-measure for every n: Therefore, in particular, the set D \ [t;t0
n] has
positive ￿-measure for every n: Consequently, for every n we may choose ~ tn 2 D\[t;t0
n]; and
therefore f(t0
n) ￿ f(~ tn) ￿ g(~ tn) ￿ g(t); for all n: In particular, f(t0
n) ￿ g(t) for all n; so that
f(t) = limn f(t0
n) ￿ g(t); proving the claim.
Consequently, f(t) ￿ _g2Lfg(t) for every t 2 C: Hence, because f itself is a member of
Lf; f(t) = _g2Lfg(t) = ￿ f(t) for every t 2 C and therefore for ￿-a.e. t 2 T:
If f is not measurable, then by Lemma A.11, we may repeat the argument replacing
f with a measurable and monotone ~ f : T ! A that is ￿-almost-everywhere equal to f;
concluding that ~ f(t) = _g2L ~ fg(t) for ￿-a.e. t 2 T: But Lf = L ~ f then implies that for ￿-a.e.
t 2 T; f(t) = ~ f(t) = _g2L ~ fg(t) = _g2Lfg(t) = ￿ f(t):
Lemma A.15. Assume G.1, G.3 and G.4. Suppose that the join operator on A is continuous
and that ￿ : T ! [0;1] is a monotone and measurable function such that ￿(￿￿1(c)) = 0 for








if ￿(t) ￿ j1 ￿ 2￿j and ￿ < 1=2
if ￿(t) ￿ j1 ￿ 2￿j and ￿ ￿ 1=2
if ￿(t) > j1 ￿ 2￿j
(A.5)
Then h : [0;1] ￿ M ￿ M ! M is continuous.
Proof. Suppose that (￿k;fk;gk) ! (￿;f;g) 2 [0;1] ￿ M ￿ M: By Lemma A.12, there is
a ￿-measure one subset, D; of T such that fk(t) ! f(t) and gk(t) ! g(t) for every t 2 D:
There are three cases: ￿ = 1=2, ￿ > 1=2 and ￿ < 1=2:
56It can be further shown that, for all t 2 T; ￿ f(t) = _fa 2 A : a ￿ f(t0) for all t0 ￿ t s.t. t0 2 T is a ￿
quasi-continuity point of fg: But we will not need this result.
37Suppose that ￿ < 1=2: For each t 2 D such that ￿(t) < j1 ￿ 2￿j; we have ￿(t) <
j1 ￿ 2￿kj for all k large enough. Hence, h(￿k;fk;gk)(t) = fk(t) for all k large enough,
and so h(￿k;fk;gk)(t) = fk(t) ! f(t) = h(￿;f;g)(t): Similarly, for each t 2 D such that
￿(t) > j1 ￿ 2￿j; h(￿k;fk;gk)(t) = fk(t) _ gk(t) ! f(t) _ g(t) = h(￿;f;g)(t); where the limit
follows because _ is continuous. Because ￿(ft 2 T : ￿(t) = j1 ￿ 2￿jg) = 0; we have therefore
shown that if ￿ < 1=2; then h(￿k;fk;gk)(t) ! h(￿;f;g)(t) for ￿ a.e. t 2 T and so, by Lemma
A.12, h(￿k;fk;gk) ! h(￿;f;g):
Because the case ￿ > 1=2 is similar to ￿ < 1=2; we consider only the remaining case
in which ￿ = 1=2: In this case, j1 ￿ 2￿kj ! 0: Consequently, for any t 2 T such that
￿(t) > 0; we have h(￿k;fk;gk)(t) = fk(t) _ gk(t) for k large enough and so h(￿k;fk;gk)(t) =
fk(t) _ gk(t) ! f(t) _ g(t) = h(1=2;f;g)(t): Hence, because ￿(ft 2 T : ￿(t) = 0g) = 0, we
have shown that h(￿k;fk;gk)(t) ! h(1=2;f;g)(t) for ￿ a.e. t 2 T, and so again by Lemma
A.12, h(￿k;fk;gk) ! h(￿;f;g):
Lemma A.16. Under G.1-G.5, the metric space (M;￿) is an absolute retract.
Proof. De￿ne h : [0;1]￿M￿M ! M by h(￿;s;s0)(t) = ￿s(t)+(1￿￿)s0(t) for all t 2 T if
G.5(i) holds, and by (A.5) if G.5(ii) holds, where the monotone function ￿(￿) appearing in
(A.5) is de￿ned by (A.2). Note that h maps into M in case G.5(i) holds because A is convex
(which itself follows because the partial order on A is convex). We claim that, in each case,
h is continuous. Indeed, if G.5(ii) holds, the continuity of h follows from Lemmas A.3 and
A.15. If G.5(i) holds and the sequence (￿n;sn;s0
n) 2 [0;1] ￿ M ￿ M converges to (￿;s;s0);
then by Lemma A.12, sn(t) ! s(t) and s0
n(t) ! s0(t) for ￿-a.e. t 2 T: Hence, because A is a
convex topological space, ￿nsn(t)+(1￿￿n)s0
n(t) ! ￿s(t)+(1￿￿)s0(t) for ￿-a.e. t 2 T: But
then Lemma A.12 implies ￿nsn + (1 ￿ ￿n)s0
n ! ￿s + (1 ￿ ￿)s0; as desired.
One consequence of the continuity of h is that for any g 2 M; h(￿;￿;g) is a contraction
for M so that (M;￿) is contractible. Hence, by Borsuk (1966, IV (9.1)) and Dugundji
(1965), it su¢ ces to show that for each f0 2 M and each neighborhood U of f0; there is a
neighborhood V of f0 and contained in U such that the sets V n; n ￿ 1; de￿ned inductively
by V 1 = h([0;1];V;V ); V n+1 = h([0;1];V;V n); are all contained in U:
We shall establish this by way of contradiction. Speci￿cally, let us suppose to the contrary
that for some neighborhood U of f0 2 M there is no open set V containing f0 and contained in
U such that all the V n as de￿ned above are contained in U: In particular, for each k = 1;2;:::;
taking V to be B1=k(f0); the 1=k ball around f0, there exists nk such that some gk 2 V nk is
not in U: We derive a contradiction separately for each of the two cases, G.5(i) and G.5(ii).
Case I. Suppose G.5(i) holds. For each n; V n+1 ￿ coV; so that for every k = 1;2;:::; gk 2
V nk ￿ coB1=k(f0): Hence, for each k there exist fk
1;:::;fk


























n2(t);::: converges to f0(t) for ￿-a.e. t 2 T and so for all
t in some measurable set D having ￿-measure one. But then for each t 2 D \ E and every
convex neighborhood Wt of f0(t); each of fk
1(t);:::;fk






j (t) is in Wt for k large enough as well. But this implies, by the
local convexity of A; that gk(t) ! f0(t) for every t 2 D \ E and hence for ￿-a.e. t 2 T:
Lemma A.12 then implies that gk ! f0; contradicting that no gk is in U.
Case II. Suppose G.5(ii) holds. As a matter of notation, for f;g 2 M; write f ￿ g if
f(t) ￿ g(t) for ￿-a.e. t 2 T. Also, for any sequence of monotone functions f1;f2;:::; in M;
38denote by f1 _f2 _::: the monotone function taking the value limn[f1(t)_f2(t)_:::_fn(t)]
for each t in T: This is well-de￿ned by Lemma A.5.
If g 2 V 1; then g = h(￿;f0;f1) for some ￿ 2 [0;1] and some f0;f1 2 V: Hence, by the
de￿nition of h; we have g ￿ f0 _ f1 and either f0 ￿ g or f1 ￿ g: We may choose the indices
so that f0 ￿ g ￿ f0 _f1: Inductively, it can similarly be seen that if g 2 V n; then there exist
f0;f1;:::;fn 2 V such that
f0 ￿ g ￿ f0 _ ::: _ fn: (A.6)
Hence, for each k = 1;2;:: , gk 2 V nk and (A.6) imply that there exist fk
0;:::;fk




0 ￿ gk ￿ f
k
0 _ ::: _ f
k
nk: (A.7)




n2;::: . Because fk
j is in B1=k(f0); this sequence
converges to f0: Let us reindex this sequence as f1;f2;::: . Hence, fj ! f0:
Because for every n the set ffn;fn+1;:::g contains the set ffk
0;:::;fk




0 _ ::: _ f
k
nk ￿ _j￿nfj;
for every n and all large enough k. Combined with (A.7), this implies that
f
k
0 ￿ gk ￿ _j￿nfj (A.8)
for every n and all large enough k.
Now, fk
0 ! f0 as k ! 1: Hence, by Lemma A.12, fk
0(t) ! f0(t) for ￿-a.e. t 2 T.
Consequently, if for ￿-a.e. t 2 T; _j￿nfj(t) ! f0(t) as n ! 1; then (A.8) and Lemma
A.4 would imply that gk(t) ! f0(t) for ￿-a.e. t 2 T. Then, Lemma A.12 would imply that
gk ! f0 contradicting that no gk is in U; and completing the proof.
It therefore remains only to establish that for ￿ a.e. t 2 T; _j￿nfj(t) ! f0(t) as n ! 1:
But, by Lemma A.18, because A is locally complete this will follow if fj(t) !j f0(t) for ￿
a.e. t; which follows from Lemma A.12 because fj ! f0:
A.4. Locally Complete Metric Semilattices
Lemma A.17. If A is a compact upper-bound-convex subset of Euclidean space and a
semilattice under the coordinatewise partial order, then A is a metric semilattice, i.e., _ is
continuous.
Proof. Suppose that an ! a, bn ! b; a _ b = c; and an _ bn ! d; where all of these points
are in A: We must show that c = d: Because an ￿ an _ bn; taking limits implies a ￿ d:
Similarly, b ￿ d; so that c = a _ b ￿ d: Thus, it remains only to show that c ￿ d:
Let ￿ a = _A denote the largest element of A; which is well de￿ned by Lemma A.6. By the
upper-bound-convexity of A; "￿ a+(1￿")c 2 A for every " 2 [0;1]: Because the coordinatewise
partial order is closed, it su¢ ces to show that "￿ a + (1 ￿ ")c ￿ d for every " > 0 su¢ ciently
small. So, ￿x " 2 (0;1) and consider the kth coordinate, ck; of c: If for some n; akn > ck; then
because ￿ ak ￿ akn we have ￿ ak > ck and therefore "￿ ak +(1￿")ck > ck: Consequently, because
akn !n ak ￿ ck; we have "￿ ak+(1￿")ck > akn for all n su¢ ciently large. On the other hand,
suppose that akn ￿ ck for all n: Then because ￿ ak ￿ ck we have "￿ ak + (1 ￿ ")ck ￿ akn for all
n: So, in either case "￿ ak +(1￿")ck ￿ akn for all n su¢ ciently large. Therefore, because k is
arbitrary, "￿ a + (1 ￿ ")c ￿ an for all n su¢ ciently large. Similarly, "￿ a + (1 ￿ ")c ￿ bn for all
39n su¢ ciently large. Therefore, because "￿ a + (1 ￿ ")c 2 A; "￿ a + (1 ￿ ")c ￿ an _ bn for all n
su¢ ciently large: Taking limits in n gives "￿ a + (1 ￿ ")c ￿ d:
Lemma A.18. If G.3 holds, then A is locally complete if and only if for every a 2 A and
every sequence an converging to a; limn(_k￿nak) = a:
Proof. We ￿rst demonstrate the ￿only if￿direction. Suppose that A is locally complete,
that U is a neighborhood of a 2 A; and that an ! a: By local completeness, there is a
neighborhood W of a contained in U such that every subset of W has a least upper bound
in U: In particular, because for n large enough fan;an+1;:::g is a subset of W; the least upper
bound of fan;an+1;:::g; namely _k￿nak; is in U for n large enough. Since U was arbitrary,
this implies limn(_k￿nak) = a:
We now turn to the ￿if￿direction. Fix any a 2 A; and let B1=n(a) denote the open ball
around a with radius 1=n: For each n; _B1=n(a) is well-de￿ned by Lemma A.6. Moreover,
because _B1=n(a) is nonincreasing in n; limn _B1=n(a) exists by Lemma A.5. We ￿rst argue
that limn _B1=n(a) = a: For each n; construct as in the proof of Lemma A.6 a sequence
fan;mg of points in B1=n(a) such that limm(an;1 _ ::: _ an;m) = _B1=n(a): We may therefore
choose mn su¢ ciently large so that the distance between an;1_:::_an;mn and _B1=n(a) is less
than 1=n: Consider now the sequence fa1;1;:::;a1;m1;a2;1;:::;a2;m2;a3;1;:::;a3;m3;:::g: Because
an;m is in B1=n(a); this sequence converges to a: Consequently, by hypothesis,
lim
n (an;1 _ ::: _ an;mn _ a(n+1);1 _ ::: _ a(n+1);m(n+1) _ :::) = a:
But because every ak;j in the join in parentheses on the left-hand side above (denote this
join by bn) is in B1=n(a); we have
an;1 _ ::: _ an;mn ￿ bn ￿ _B1=n(a):
Therefore, because for every n the distance between an;1 _ ::: _ an;mn and _B1=n(a) is less
than 1=n; Lemma A.4 implies that limn _B1=n(a) = limn bn: But since limn bn = a; we have
limn _B1=n(a) = a. Next, for each n; let Sn be an arbitrary nonempty subset of B1=n(a); and
choose any sn 2 Sn: Then sn ￿ _Sn ￿ _B1=n(a): Because sn 2 B1=n(a); Lemma A.4 implies
that limn _Sn = a: Consequently, for every neighborhood U of a; there exists n large enough
such that _S (well-de￿ned by Lemma A.6) is in U for every subset S of B1=n(a): Since a was
arbitrary, A is locally complete.
Lemma A.19. Every compact Euclidean metric semilattice is locally complete.
Proof. Suppose that an ! a with every an and a in the semilattice, which we assume
to be a subset of RK. By Lemma A.18, it su¢ ces to show that limn(_k￿nak) = a: By
Lemma A.5, limn(_k￿nak) exists and is equal to limn limm(an _ ::: _ am) since an _ ::: _ am
is nondecreasing in m; and limm(an _ ::: _ am) is nonincreasing in n: For each dimension
k = 1;:::;K; let ak
n;m denote the ￿rst among an;an+1;:::;am with the largest kth coordinate.
Hence, an_:::_am = a1
n;m_:::_aK
n;m; where the right-hand side consists of K terms. Because
an ! a, limm ak
n;m exists for each k and n; and limn limm ak
n;m = a for each k: Consequently,
limn limm(an_:::_am) = limn limm(a1
n;m_:::_aK
n;m) = (limn limm a1
n;m)_:::_(limn limm aK
n;m) =
a _ ::: _ a = a, as desired.
Lemma A.20. If G.4 holds and for all a 2 A; every neighborhood of a contains a0 such that
b0 ￿ a0 for all b0 close enough to a; then A is locally complete.
40Proof. Suppose that an ! a: By Lemma A.18, it su¢ ces to show that limn(_k￿nak) = a:
For every n and m; am ￿ am _am+1 _:::_am+n, and so taking the limit ￿rst as n ! 1 and
then as m ! 1 gives a ￿ limm _k￿mak; where the limit in n exists by Lemma A.5 because
the sequence is monotone. Hence, it su¢ ces to show that limm _k￿mak ￿ a.
Let U be a neighborhood of a and let a0 be chosen as in the statement of the lemma.
Then, because am ! a; am ￿ a0 for all m large enough. Consequently, for m large enough
and for all n, am _ am+1 _ ::: _ am+n ￿ a0: Taking the limit ￿rst in n and then in m yields
limm _k￿mak ￿ a0: Because for every neighborhood U of a this holds for some a0 in U;
limm _k￿mak ￿ a; as desired.
A.5. Assumption G.3
Say that two points in a partially ordered metric space are strictly ordered if they are con-
tained in disjoint open sets and every member of one set is greater or equal to every member
of the other. The following lemma provides a su¢ cient condition for G.3 to hold when T
happens to be a separable metric space.
Lemma A.21. Suppose that (T;T ;￿;￿) is a partially ordered probability space, that T is
a separable metric space and that T contains the open sets. Then G.3 holds if every atomless
set having positive ￿-measure contains two strictly ordered points.
Proof. Let T 0 be the union of a countable dense subset of T and the countable set of atoms
of ￿; and suppose that D 2 T has positive ￿-measure. We must show that t1 ￿ t0 ￿ t2 for
some t1;t2 2 D and some t0 2 T 0:
If D contains an atom, t0; of ￿; then we may set t1 = t2 = t0 and we are done. Hence,
we may assume that D is atomless.
Without loss, we may assume that ￿(D\U) > 0 for every open set U whose intersection
with D is nonempty.57 Because ￿(D) > 0; there exist t0
1;t2 2 D and open sets U0
1 containing
t0
1 and U2 containing t2 such that every member of U0
1 is greater or equal to every member
of U2; which we shall write as U0
1 ￿ U2:
Because D \ U0
1 is nonempty ￿it contains t0
1 ￿￿(D \ U0
1) > 0. Consequently, there exist
t1;t00
1 2 D \ U0
1 and open sets U1 containing t1 and U00
1 containing t00
1 such that U1 ￿ U00
1:
Hence, U1 \ U0
1 ￿ U00
1 \ U0
1 ￿ U2: Therefore, because the open set U00
1 \ U0
1 is nonempty ￿it
contains t00
1 ￿it contains some t0 in the dense set T 0: Hence, t1 ￿ t0 ￿ t2; because t1 2 U1\U0
1
and t2 2 U2: Noting that t1 and t2 are members of D completes the proof.
A.6. Proofs from Section 5
Proof of Corollary 5.2. Consider the uniform-price auction but where unit-bids can be
any nonnegative real number. Because marginal values are between zero and one, without
loss we may restrict attention to unit-bids in [0;1]: The resulting game is discontinuous.
Remark 3.1 of Reny (1999) establishes that if this game is better-reply secure, then the limit
of a convergent sequence of pure strategy "-equilibria, as " tends to zero, is a pure strategy
equilibrium. Hence, in view of Lemma A.13, it su¢ ces to show that the auction game is
57Otherwise, replace D with D \ V c; where V is the largest open set whose intersection with D has ￿-
measure zero. To see that V is well-de￿ned, let fUig be a countable base of open sets: Then V is the union
of all the Ui satisfying ￿(Ui \ D) = 0:
41better-reply secure (when players employ monotone pure strategies) and that it possesses,
for every " > 0; an "-equilibrium in monotone pure strategies.
An argument analogous to that given in the ￿rst paragraph on p. 1046 of Reny (1999)
shows that the uniform-price auction game with unit-bid space [0;1] is better-reply secure
when bidders employ monotone pure strategies. Fix " > 0: By Proposition 5.1, for each
k = 1;2;:::; there is a monotone pure strategy equilibrium, bk; of the uniform-price auction
when unit-bids are restricted to the ￿nite set f0;1=k;2=k;:::;k=kg: It su¢ ces to show that
for all k su¢ ciently large, bk is an "-equilibrium of the game in which unit-bids can be chosen
from [0;1]:
Fix player i: Let D denote the set of nonincreasing bid vectors in [0;1]m: It su¢ ces to
show that for all k su¢ ciently large and all monotone pure strategies b : Ti ! D for player
i; there is a monotone pure strategy b0 : Ti ! D \ f0;1=k;2=k;:::;k=kgm that yields player
i utility within " of b(￿) uniformly in the others￿strategies. By weak dominance, it su¢ ces
to consider monotone pure strategies b : Ti ! D for player i such that each unit-bid, bj(ti);
is in [0;tij] for every ti = (ti1;:::;tim) 2 Ti: So, let b(￿) be such a monotone pure strategy
and let b0 : Ti ! D \ f0;1=k;2=k;:::;k=kgm be such that for every ti 2 Ti; b0
j(ti) is the
smallest member of f0;1=k;:::;k=kg greater or equal to bj(ti): Hence, b0(￿) is monotone and
b0
1(ti) ￿ ::: ￿ b0
m(ti) every ti 2 Ti; so that b0(￿) is a feasible monotone pure strategy. If bidder
i employs b0(￿) instead of b(￿); then regardless of his type and for any strategies the others
might employ and for each j = 1;:::;m; bidder i will win a jth unit whenever b(￿) would
have won a jth unit although the price might be higher because his bid vector is higher, and
he may win a jth unit when b(￿) would not have. The increase in the price caused by the at
most 1=k increase in each of his unit-bids can be no greater than 1=k; and because bj(ti) ￿ tij
for every ti 2 Ti; the ex-post surplus lost on each additional unit won from employing b0(￿)
instead of b(￿) can be no greater than 1=k: Hence, the total ex-post loss in surplus as a result
of the strategy change can be no greater than 2m=k; which can be made arbitrarily small for
k su¢ ciently large, regardless of the others￿strategies. Hence, i￿ s expected utility loss from
employing b0(￿) instead of b(￿) is, for k large enough, less than "; and this holds uniformly in
the others￿strategies.
Proof of Corollary 5.5. Analogous to the proof of Corollary 5.2 above.
Proof of Lemma 5.3. Fix monotone pure strategies for all players but i: For the remainder
of this proof, we omit most subscripts i to keep the notation manageable. Let v(b;t) denote
bidder i￿ s expected payo⁄from employing the bid vector b = (b1;:::;bm) when his type vector
is t = (t1;:::;tm): Then, letting Pk(bk) denote the probability that bidder i wins at least k
units ￿which depends only on his kth unit-bid bk ￿we have, where 1k is an m-vector of k
ones followed by m ￿ k zeros,
v(b;t) = u(0) +
m X
k=1













where u(x) = 1￿e￿rx
r is bidder i￿ s utility function with constant absolute risk aversion para-
meter r ￿ 0; where it is understood that u(x) = x when r = 0: Note that the dependence of
r on i has been suppressed.
42From now on we shall proceed as if r > 0 because all of the formulae employed here have
well-de￿ned limits as r tends to zero that correspond to the risk neutral case u(x) = x:










As shown in (5.2) from subsection 5.1 (and setting ￿ p = p = 0 there), for each k = 2;:::;m;






is nondecreasing in t according to the partial order ￿i de￿ned in (5.1). Henceforth, we shall
employ the partial order ￿i on i￿ s type space. We next demonstrate the following facts.
(i) wk(bk;t) is nondecreasing in t; and
(ii) wk(￿ bk;t) ￿ wk(bk;t) is nondecreasing in t for all ￿ bk ￿ bk;






























The ￿rst term in the sum is nondecreasing in t according to ￿i by (A.9) and the second
term, being nondecreasing in the coordinatewise partial order is, a fortiori, nondecreasing in
t according to ￿i.
Turning to (ii), if Pk(bk) = 0 then wk(bk;t) = 0 and (ii) follows from (i). So, assume
Pk(bk) > 0: Then,






































The ￿rst term in the sum is nondecreasing in t according to ￿i by (i) and the second term,
being nondecreasing in the coordinatewise partial order is, a fortiori, nondecreasing in t
according to ￿i. This proves (ii).
43Suppose now that the vector of bids b is optimal for bidder i when his type vector is t;
and that b0 is optimal when his type is t0 ￿i t: We must argue that b_b0 is optimal when his
type is t0: If bk ￿ b0
k for all k; then b _ b0 = b0 and we are done. Hence, we may assume that
there is a maximal set of consecutive coordinates of b that are strictly greater than those of
b0: That is, there exist coordinates j and l with j ￿ l such that bk > b0
k for k = j;:::;l and
bj￿1 ￿ b0
j￿1 and bl+1 ￿ b0
l+1; where the ￿rst of the last two inequalities is ignored if j = 1
and the second is ignored if l = m.
Let ^ b be the bid vector obtained from b by replacing its coordinates j through l with the
coordinates j through l of b0: Because b is optimal at t and ^ b is nonincreasing and therefore
feasible, v(b;t) ￿ v(^ b;t) is nonnegative. Dividing v(b;t) ￿ v(^ b;t) by er(b1+:::+bj); this implies
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￿




















































To see this, note that because bl+1 ￿ b0
l+1; the bid vector b00 obtained from b0 by replacing
its coordinates l + 1 through m with the coordinates l + 1 through m of b is a feasible
(i.e., nonincreasing) bid vector. Consequently, because b0 is optimal at t0 we must have
0 ￿ v(b0;t0) ￿ v(b00;t0): But this di⁄erence in utilities is precisely the di⁄erence between
the right-hand and left-hand sides of (A.11) multiplied by er(b1+:::+bl); thereby establishing
(A.11).












































44where ~ b is the nonincreasing and therefore feasible bid vector obtained from b0 by replacing
its coordinates j through l with the coordinates j through l of b: Hence, ~ b is optimal at t0
because v(~ b;t0) ￿ v(b0;t0) and b0 is optimal at t0.
Thus, we have shown that whenever j;:::;l is a maximal set of consecutive coordinates
such that bk > b0
k for all k = j;:::;l; replacing in b0 the unit-bids b0
j;:::;b0
l with the coordinate-
by-coordinate larger unit bids bj;:::;bl results in a bid vector that is optimal at t0: Applying
this result ￿nitely often leads to the conclusion that b _ b0 is optimal at t0; as desired.
Lemma A.22. Consider the price competition game from subsection 5.3. Under the partial
orders on types ￿i de￿ned there for each ￿rm i, each ￿rm possesses a monotone pure strategy
best reply when the other ￿rms employ monotone pure strategies.
Proof. Suppose that all ￿rms j 6= i employ monotone pure strategies according to ￿j
de￿ned in subsection 5.3. Therefore, in particular, pj(cj;xj) is nondecreasing in cj for each
xj; and (5.6) applies. For the remainder of this proof, we omit most subscripts i to keep the
notation manageable.
Because ￿rm i￿ s interim payo⁄ function is continuous in his price for each of his types
and because his action space, [0;1]; is totally ordered and compact, ￿rm i possesses a largest
best reply, ^ p(c;x); for each of his types (c;x) 2 [0;1]2: We will show that ^ p(￿) is monotone
according to ￿i :
Let ￿ t = (￿ c; ￿ x); t = (c;x) in [0;1]2 be two types of ￿rm i; and suppose that ￿ t ￿i t:
Hence, ￿ c ￿ c and ￿ x ￿ x = ￿(￿ c ￿ c) for some ￿ 2 [0;￿i]: Let ￿ p = ^ p(￿ c; ￿ x); p = ^ p(c;x); and
t￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)t + ￿￿ t for ￿ 2 [0;1]: We wish to show that ￿ p ￿ p:




























(￿ c ￿ c) +
@2vi(p;t￿)
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(￿ x ￿ x)
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dp












where the inequality follows by (5.6) if p ￿ p0 ￿ ￿ c: Therefore, vi(p;￿ t) ￿ vi(p0;￿ t) ￿ vi(p;t) ￿
vi(p0;t) ￿ 0; where the ￿rst inequality follows because t0 = t; t1 = ￿ t; and the second because
p is a best reply at t: Therefore, we have shown the following: If p ￿ ￿ c; then
vi(p;￿ t) ￿ vi(p
0;￿ t) ￿ 0; for all p
0 2 [￿ c;p]:
Hence, if p ￿ ￿ c; then ^ p(￿ t) = ￿ p ￿ p = ^ p(t) because ^ p(￿ t) is the largest best reply at
￿ t and because no best reply at ￿ t = (￿ c; ￿ x) is below ￿ c: On the other hand, if p < ￿ c; then
￿ p = ^ p(￿ t) ￿ ￿ c > p = ^ p(t); where the ￿rst inequality again follows because no best reply at ￿ t
is below ￿ c. We conclude that ￿ p ￿ p; as desired.
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